AIDING INDIGENOUS REPAIR AND RECOVERY
An Interim Evaluation
of
The Afghanistan Urban Rehabilitation Programme
(AFG/93/002)

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Substantial Achievement
At the mid-point in its two year cycle the Afghanistan Urban Rehabilitation Programme (AURP) is making substantial progress toward achieving its objectives. Programme staff engage with urban neighbourhoods and municipal departments in a way that forcefully captures the spirit of its development objective:

> "To facilitate and support the indigenous process of repair and recovery in the urban areas of Afghanistan."

Implicit in the work of the Programme is the belief that, even against the greatest of odds, people pick themselves up in response to human tragedy, and that the role of outside helpers, like UNCHS (HABITAT), is to be a catalyst in this process.

The table below illustrates AURP's progress in terms of funds used, number of projects implemented and key outputs achieved. It highlights areas where the Programme is at variance with its design document and suggests some directions for the remainder of this programme and for future urban rehabilitation activities. The table falls short in fully conveying the substaintial "capacity building" changes evident in the participating municipalities and neighbourhoods. These changes are captured more fully in the body of the text (particularly in Sections V.C &D.).

Evolving Programme Concept
Staff have developed a broad and flexible understanding of the term "rehabilitation" which continues to evolve with experience. They make the analogy with the human healing process after some physical damage. They describe "repair" as the shorter term, physical repair of the human body - fixing a cast on the broken leg for example, and "recovery" as the longer term, physical, social and psychological healing process - restoring the patient's ability and confidence to use the leg, as before. In rehabilitation, both repair and recovery have their place; indeed, both are needed. As applied to urban rehabilitation in Afghanistan, this understanding translates into a broad programme response that accommodates both short term emergency assistance, physical construction and longer term human/ institutional and financial capacity building. The key to choosing the appropriate response at any given time, and in any given situation is consultation - meeting with people who have a stake in their community as "collaborators" rather than as "recipients".

Concept into Practice
Over the past fourteen months, the Programme has developed a working method that effectively puts this conceptual understanding of rehabilitation into practice. Repair and recovery is evident, not only in the many physical projects such as neighbourhood drainage and access improvements, flood protection, municipal and neighbourhood water supply and waste removal. It is also evident in the quality, innovative nature, and social impact of the projects and the processes followed.

Table: AURP Activities - Initially Planned Versus Implemented

As Initially Planned for January 1995 - December 1996			Implemented & Under Implementation (for January 1995 - March 1997 - as Evaluated in May 1996)				The Way Ahead (to March 1997 and through a Possible Three Year Extension)
Objectives Activities Outputs	**Budget Anticipated**	**# of Sub-contracts**	**Budget Allocated[1]**	**# of Projects[2] /Sub-contracts**	**Summary of Achievements**	**Comments: Differences between Intended and Actual**	
1.0 Neighbourhood Action Programme (NAP)							• Increasingly augment AURP-led relief and physical repair activities (e.g. distributing blankets, drainage construction) with local organization-led technical, institutional and financial recovery activities (e.g. community forums, municipal finance). • Steadily devolve responsibility for planning and implementation to local neighbourhood and municipal organizations. This will require: a) further strengthening AURP participatory planniing, management and assessment systems and staff capacities so that staff (especially Afghan staff) can increasingly play leadership roles; b) developing and demonstrating, in collaboration with local organizations, models of urban physical improvements that are simple and affordable enough (e.g. Karachi waste collection system), to be develoved for such organizations and targetted to involve and assist the most needy; and c) strengthening capacities (technical, organizational, financial) of such organizations to manage and improve models devolved to them. • Strengthened organizational capacities will require developing and demonstrating ways for local organizations to strengthen their technical, organizational and financial capacities (eg. through action-research on appropriate technologies, land development,municipal finance, cost efficient land-use, small enterprise development, assests and services of neighbourhood and municipal organziations and on further involving women)
1.1 Water and sanitation	$1,600,000	35	$583,258	30	• established self-run, self financed waste disposal system. • 1,200 handpumps manufactured, 400 installed • 1,072 stone masonry steps constructed • community forums (training, day care and health services, income generation, local governance)	Less emphasis on physical outputs, relative to community development and institututional strengthening (approx $60,000 non UNDP funds used)	
1.2 Building materials supply & other components		25					
1.3 Improved pedestrian access		25					
2.0 Municipal Infrastructure Repair (MIP)							
2.1 Improved water systems repair facilities	$800,000	1	$794,570	26	• Piped water supply systems repaired/ improved (pumps, pipes, generators) • 6,000 cubic meters of sludge material excavated • 70 solid waste collection points and systems established	Heavy use of Food for Work. Less use of sub-contractors/ NGOs, greater use of neighbourhood groups, municipal departments and in-house staff (approx $250,000 non UNDP funds used)	
2.2 Local area network rehabilitation		5					
2.3 Generators for pumps		1					
2.4 Other community infrastructure elements		5					

1 Actual budget amounts for activities are greater than envisaged in the Programme Document due to resources contributed externally (See Table 4-2).

2 Numbers in this column includes both "sub-contracts" to independent contractors and "projects" carried out "in-house".

Table: AURP Activities - Initially Planned Versus Implemented (Continued)

As Initially Planned for January 1995 - December 1996			Implemented & Under Implementation (for January 1995 - March 1997 - as Evaluated in May 1996)				The Way Ahead (to March 1997 and through a Possible Three Year Extension)
Objectives Activities Outputs	**Budget Anticipated**	**# Sub-contracts**	**Budget Allocated**	**# Sub-contracts**	**Summary of Achievements**	**Comments: Differences between Intended and Actual**	
3.0 Solid Waste Disposal							
3.1 Sub-contracts to clean waste	also to be drawn from $800,000 (see above)	10	$126,744	6	• removal of 79,000 cu meters of waste	In practice, component merged with NAP and MIP (approx $110,000 non UNDP funds used)	
4.0 Municipal Strengthening							
4.1 Mapping and data collection	also to be drawn from $800,000 (see above)	N/A	$60,965	3	• district and neighbourhood surveys completed in all three cities • basic urban information (i.e.sites and services) collected • strengthened neighbourhood and municipal organizations	Crosscutting theme in MAP and MIP. Approx 2/3 emphasis on mapping and data collection, 1/3 on other "municipal strengthening" items. Less emphasis on land policy/planning feasibility studies and training. (approx $8,000 non UNDP funds used)	
4.2 Land issues		N/A					
4.3 Training		N/A					
4.4 Pre-feasibility studies		10					
4.5 Support structure		N/A					
5.0 Relief							
5.1 Sanitation	Not Envisaged		$200,000	1	• waste removal, • plastic sheeting, blankets	($100,000 from other UN source, the rest from int. donors)	
5.2 Shelter			$160,000	2			
TOTALS	**$2,400,000**	**121**	**$1,925,537**	**73**			

Source: AFG/93/002 Programme Document
Programme Support Office

The Programme engages with neighbourhood residents, their representatives in the municipality, and with engineers and managers of municipal service departments in a manner that:

- strengthens the role of each of these groups in neighbourhood/municipal governance and programming, and
- reinforces the relationships between them.

Whether operating at the neighbourhood level or at the larger municipal level (AURP does both), Programme staff sit with and listen to the situation of the effected groups, and together prioritize needs and create a plan that calls on each group to contribute to the solution. So far, the Evaluators find, this working method has earned the Programme the respect of all the participating groups. It has also been noted by other humanitarian assistance and development organizations (both UN and external). UNCHS's programme in Afghanistan has a strong reputation among these groups as evidenced by the degree of field level collaboration, adaptation by these groups of the working method in other community settings, the number of requests for UNCHS to expand beyond its current area of concentration, and the amount of additional funds the Programme has been able to attract.

As a catalyst in this indigenous process, AURP not only channels funds and facilitates problem solving and planning, it also creates technologies and systems to support works in repair and recovery. To date these include:

- a mapping system of very high quality and utility to assist neighbourhood groups, municipal leaders and the staff of municipal departments identify needs and plan solutions;
- an inexpensive hand pump system tailored for local conditions,
- an innovative, community-financed waste disposal scheme, and
- community forums led by women, as centres for the physical, economic, and social development of neighbourhoods.

Competent and Committed Staff

The AURP is staffed by highly committed and competent teams both in the field (Kabul, Mazar i Sharif, and Herat) and in the Programme Support Office (in Islamabad). This is clear from their abilities to pull together to reach common objectives and from the quality of their output. The staff are capable of being innovative and flexible, and of being reflective in action. Their enthusiastic and insightful participation, with us, in collaborative evaluation and planning workshops underscores this observation.

A Time for Consolidation

As this mid-term assessment demonstrates, AURP is a "result in progress". Staff are learning about the results of their activities as they unfold around them. Refinements to the Programme's methods, management and organization are ongoing, and more are needed to consolidate the successes that have already been achieved. Twenty-one recommendations emerge from this evaluation. They are summarized below and elaborated upon in Section VI.

Recommendations - Programme as a Whole:

a) Finding/Issue: AURP Extension
As a two year programme, the AURP is too short for its impacts to be fully realized. This combined with the creditable performance of the Programme, to date, and the continuing needs of Afghanistan for rehabilitation suggest that the Programme be extended.

Recommendation:
Extend the Programme beyond March 1997 for a minimum period of three years. Let the Programme staff lead the process of formulating the extended or new Programme, perhaps aided by facilitators and/ or resource persons. Begin the process of designing the extended Programme within the next month or so to ensure that all that is necessary is in place by the start of the Programme in March 1997 *(See Finding XVI in Section VI)*.

b) Finding/Issue: Future Expansion
With the general success of the AURP, there is pressure for the Programme to expand beyond its current programme areas of concentration. Possibilities include expansion to smaller cities and towns in the three regions of Kabul, Mazar and Herat and expansion to new areas such as Qandahar. At the same time, evidence presented in this report suggests that the Programme will be under pressure to achieve its existing mandate before the end of its term in March 1997.

Recommendation:
The Project Management Team should examine and make a recommendation on expansion. Before recommending significant expansion, it should seriously consider the need to ensure a consolidation of the existing Programme along the lines of improvements suggested in the recommendations outlined below. The capacity of the Programme to efficiently and effectively manage itself and benefit its constituents should be secured before such expansion is embarked upon. Any expansion should be undertaken with additional and adequate resources, financial, human, and physical and not through the rearrangement of existing resources. *(See Finding XXIV, Section VI)*

c) Finding/Issue: Programme Planning and Decision-making
There is no overall, explicit planning and decision-making framework and process to link together the National Programme Manager, the Programme Support Office and the Regional Programme Offices. In addition, Regional Programme Offices develop their activities without an explicit planning process for their regions and without explicit reference to the national Programme. They also develop their activities without being given clear budgetary parameters. *(Reference Section IV.D.1 and IV.D.2)*

Recommendation:
Establish and support an overall Programme Management Team (PMT) as well as regional equivalents. Establish the mandate and functions of these bodies, their roles

and responsibilities, and methods for decision-making, relative to the overall Programme and relative to each regional programme. Set up a schedule to ensure the planning processes at the Regional and National level re-inforce each other.*(See Findings X and XI in Section VI)*

d) Finding/Issue: Drawing Down Programme Resources
Programme resources are being drawn down more slowly than would be expected at the mid way stage. In part this is due to the speed with which neighbourhood and municipal infrastructure projects are prepared and approved for funding *(Reference Section IV.D.4)*

Recommendation:
Streamline the payment authorization process of UNCHS Nairobi so that the time it takes to authorize payments can be reduced *(See Finding VII, in Section VI)* .

Strengthen the ability of regional programme staff to prepare programme documents suitable for presentation to the Local Contracting Committee *(See Finding VII, in Section VI).*

e) Finding/Issue: Identifying and Counting Beneficiaries
The Programme could benefit from a uniform methodology for agreeing on who, more precisely, the intended beneficiaries are being reached for, and for a uniform procedure for counting them *(Reference Section V.B.2)*

Recommendations:
Establish a reliable, simple, transparent, and commonly agreed upon method to identify and count beneficiaries for each of the project types. Using this method, review existing projects to identify the beneficiaries and their numbers, and to check whether intended beneficiaries are, indeed, being reached *(See Findings VIII and IX in Section VI).*

f) Finding/Issue: Updating the Programme Document
As it stands, the original Programme Document does not adequately reflect the Programme as it has evolved and is being currently planned and implemented. Consequently, there is no document that reflects a clearly shared understanding of the Programme as it is today and is evolving *(Reference Section III.B.2,3,4).*

Recommendation:
UNDP should review and update the Programme document and/or prepare a new programme document that accurately reflects a shared understanding of the Programme as it is today and as it is evolving. It should involve as many professional staff as possible in this process. The product of this work should be considered a foundation for future programme planning *(See Finding XII, in Section VI).*

g) Findings/Issues: Diversifying Staff Complement

Given the primacy (to AURP's mandate) of women and children beneficiaries, of the community development approach, and of financial sustainability, the Programme would benefit from diversifying its staff complement to include:

- more women, in order that the programme can more fully benefit from their insights and resources and, in particular, more squarely address the needs and aspirations of women in the community
- more staff with specialized social, community development and financial analysis backgrounds *(Reference Section IV.B.3)*

Recommendations

Actively recruit more women in professional staff positions in the Programme *(See Finding XIII in Section VI)*

Actively recruit more staff with a community development preparation *(See Finding XIV in Section VI)*

h) Findings/Issues: Addressing Staffing Issues

Given thier effects on staff morale and on effective planning and implementation, several staffing issues require attention. These are: a lengthy, cumbersome process for hiring staff, inappropriate procedures for hiring support staff, job descriptions that don't reflect responsibilities held, a salary payment procedure for Afghan staff that reportedly erodes the purchasing power of the salaries with inflation in the local currency, and disparities between international and Afghan staff in salaries and status *(Reference Section IV.B.3 &4).*

Recommendations:

Streamline the hiring process, especially for lower echelon staff; bring job descriptions and salary scales in line with jobs being done and responsibilities held; review the salary payment procedure for Afghan staff and, if need be, establish a way to stabilize the purchasing power of salaries against the volatile Afghan currency; and examine ways in which some of the disparities between the international and the Afghan staff can be mitigated or compensated for *(See Finding XV, Section VI).*

Recommendations - Municipal Level

i) Finding/Issues: Incentive System for Personnel in Technical Departments

This level of the Programme's activities relies heavily on engaging municipal officials and personnel of technical departments. The conditions of government work and salary scale of these persons are so low that many such persons have to expend much time and energy to obtain alternative sources of income to make ends meet. Most often, these activities are for the private market on projects that are for private benefit. Consequently, it is often difficult to obtain the collaboration of such persons in AURP projects geared to public benefit without an adequate incentive system *(Reference, Section V.C.1)*

Recommendation:
Identify an adequate and appropriate incentive system to engage the collaboration of municipal personnel and personnel in technical departments in projects that would help promote the public good. *(See Finding XVII, Section VI)*

j) Finding/Issue: Innovation in Urban Service Delivery
The lack of a strong municipal government with rigid, enforceable rules on how municipal services must be delivered gives AURP the room and flexibility to develop and demonstrate innovative and cost-effective ways to deliver these services. ***(Reference, Section V.C.1)***

Recommendation:
AURP should actively innovate to develop more cost, time-efficient and targetted ways of delivering municipal services. These experiments should be carefully recorded and demonstrated to residents, municipal officials and their relevant technical departments. *(See Finding XVIII, Section VI)*

k) Finding/Issue: Revenue Generation through Urban Services
Municipal resources and services such as land and water are limited. What there is, is under priced or not priced at all.***(Reference, Section V.C.1)***

Recommendation:
Examine the potential revenue-generating resources of the municipality, the market for these resources such as the land and water markets, and the potential for developing and delivering these services in a manner that is affordable to both the consumer and the provider of the service, such as the municipality. Do this with the municipality to obtain accurate information and train personnel in the design and implementation of such revenue-generating systems. *(See Finding XIX, Section VI)*

l) Finding/Issue: Consideration of Programme Impact on Urban Form
The tendency toward urban sprawl, which can result in an urban form that is inefficient, inequitable, and costly to service, may be inadvertently exacerbated by AURP projects which provide services to outlying areas such as through the gravelling of primary access roads that connect such areas to the rest of the city. *(Reference, Section V.C.1)*

Recommendation:
The patterns and trends of urban development in Kabul, Mazar and Herat, and their implications for a more compact, efficient and equitable city should be studied, especially with regard to the impact that the AURP projects are having on these. *(See Finding XX, Section VI)*

m) Finding/Issue: Encouraging a Planning Ethic
There is a need to encourage municipal and public utility institutions and their personnel to be sympathetic to and knowledgeable about planning issues such as those raised immediately above. *(Reference, Section V.C.1)*

Recommendation:
Run short training courses on municipal planning including low-cost, efficient and equitable ways to deliver municipal services and generate municipal revenues. Train municipal personnel in these topics. The offer of such training can also serve as part of a work-incentive package for engaging municipal and utilities personnel. Inviting personnel from different cities to the same training course in one of the city locations might also contribute to some breaking down of the barriers constructed by divided political factions. Gradually, if not at first, more senior members of the municipality up to the Mayor might be invited to come together to learn and exchange views on planning their cities. This might help build bridges of understanding at higher levels between these different regions or at least their cities. *(See Finding XXI. Section VI)*

Recommendations - Neighbourhood Level

n) Finding/Issue: Encouraging Broad Participation in Decision-making
Much neighbourhood activity by the AURP is done through district and neighbourhood representatives - *Raeeseh Naheeyehs* and *Wakil e Guzars* or *Kalantars*. Evidence suggests that some of these persons are not fully representative of their communities. *(Reference, Section IV.D.3)*

Recommendation:
Actively pursue the testing of the representativeness of the official neighbourhood and district heads by also speaking directly with the people. Actively pursue fostering parallel representative groups such as the Zonal *Shuras* and the Community Forums. *(See Finding XXII. Section VI)*

o) Finding/Issue: Considering the Sustainability of Neighbourhood Projects
The neighbourhood organizations approach to potential projects from AURP may vary from handing over a "wish-list" of projects to the Programme with little expectation of further involvement, to more careful selection of a preferred project, an in-kind contribution to its implementation, and forethought on how the organization could maintain the project. Some projects appear to have been implemented with little organization for their sustainable operations and maintenance *(Reference, Section IV.D.3)*

Recommendation:
Actively attempt to establish street or block or neighbourhood groups entrusted with project development and maintenance. Examine incentives for the creation and maintenance of such groups whose responsibility it could be to identify projects, select among alternative possibilities, mobilize resources, develop the project and maintain it.

Incentives such as a small matching grants system might lever local monies. Training in project development and local resource mobilization might be another incentive while at the same time strengthening the capacity to do so *(See Finding XXIII. Section VI)*

Structure of the Report

The Report is divided into six parts as described below:

- Part II describes the mandate of this interim evaluation and the methodology employed.
- Part III describes the AURP context and assesses the original design as conceived in the Programme Document
- Part IV examines the management, organization and programme development aspects of AURP
- Part V assess the results of AURP activities
- Part VI sets out the Evaluators key findings and recommendations.

Attached to this Executive Summary (Annex I) is a set of photographs giving a pictoral account of the AURP and its evaluation.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Framing the Evaluation

1. The Nature of Rehabilitation Work

The Afghanistan Urban Rehabilitation Programme (AURP) is as much about re-building the social dynamics of urban life as it is about repairing damaged buildings and services. As such, the most visible results of a programme like this - clean drinking water, passable streets and lane ways, a regular system of waste disposal - only provide a partial picture of change. Behind the scenes, citizens and their institutions are organizing to overcome the scourges of war and poverty.

Repair and recovery are natural human responses to tragedy. The drive to survive dictates that we pick ourselves up during and after a calamity. Programmes like the AURP facilitate this process. It is a delicate role to play; one that requires a lot of listening, a lot of "tuning" in to the rhythms of the community we are working with. On the one hand, there is the risk of suffocating local insight and initiative with "handouts". On the other hand, there is the risk of not meeting peoples most immediate needs.

2. Learning through Trial and Error

There are no easy formulas in this kind of work. There are broad principles and approaches but in the end, it is trial and error. A successful programme learns from its experience and that of others. Programme managers and field staff take time to reflect on their errors and achievements, and draw lessons for future practice. Evaluation can be used as a management tool to assist this interplay between action and reflection. This evaluation - a mid term assessment of the first 14 months of the AURP - has been carried out with this view in mind.

3. The Mandate and Design of this Evaluation

The Evaluation Terms of Reference (see Appendix I) favour a "forward-looking" assessment of the Programme; one that balances the sponsors accountability requirements with the implementors need to know how to make the programme work better.

In late March 1996, Canadian consultants Farokh Afshar of Development Workshop, and Philip Cox of PLAN:NET 2000 Ltd. were contracted by UNCHS to conduct an interim evaluation of the AURP. Our mandate was to:

- determine the effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and impact of the Programme to date;

- assess the adequacy of the Programme's management structure;
- highlight key issues related to implementation
- review the methodology employed by the Programme to carry out urban rehabilitation activities;
- examine the impact of cooperation in the field among UN development organizations and with public sector institutions, and
- on the basis of the findings, make recommendations for refinements.

The Evaluation Mission took place between March 28th and May 4th, 1996, 14 months after inception and one year prior to the scheduled end of the programme. The Mission included a briefing meeting in Nairobi with the former Programme Manager and current UNCHS staff team responsible for the Afghanistan Programme. Our base was Islamabad, site of the AURP Support Office and UNDP's temporary Programme Office for Afghanistan. We made three field trips to Afghanistan, one to each of the three cities where the Programme is active: Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. These trips lasted between four and six days each. In each city we met with Programme staff, community residents, district and municipal officials, managers and engineers responsible for municipal services, and other UN agency and NGO contacts. The itinerary and listing of people interviewed in Nairobi, Islamabad and Afghanistan are attached in Appendix II. Our ability to converse in the local languages of Dhurrie and Urdu (in Islamabad) helped us in the evaluation.

4. Evaluation Matrix ("Roadmap")

At the outset, we developed an evaluation matrix to help us conceptualize the Programme and organize our research. The matrix, attached in Appendix III, addresses the Terms of Reference with a set of evaluation questions and related success indicators. We developed the matrix on the basis of a review of programme documentation, one field visit and discussions with programme staff. The matrix attempts to highlight the "logic" of the AURP. It links the programme's concept (i.e. development objective and approach) to its practice (i.e. implementation), and inputs (i.e. human, financial and physical resources) to outputs and impacts (immediate and long term results).

The matrix remains in draft form for the following reasons:

- it is, and will always be incomplete given the infinite number of programme issues that can be addressed;
- it was largely conceived by two "outside" consultants rather than by people more intimately involved in the Programme; and
- we believe that tools like this should only be used in an indicative manner because the logic of a project changes over time and can be perceived differently by different people.

Notwithstanding these considerations the matrix may serve as a useful discussion piece for AURP implementors and sponsors in future planning and monitoring exercises. Some of the indicators, for example, could be adapted for use in the Programme Document of a successor Programme.

5. Collaborative Research (Evaluators-Programme Staff)

In addition to the standard evaluation routines - site visits, key informant interviews, document reviews, etc. - we engaged Programme staff in a group process of reflection. At each Regional Programme Office (Kabul, Mazar, and Herat) and at the Programme Support Office (Islamabad), we encouraged staff to describe the logic of their programme, raise issues they face implementing it and identify ways they could tell their work is succeeding. We also asked them for their recommendations. The results of these workshops are written up in Appendix IV. They are a rich source of ideas for programme development, both at the field and Programme levels.

Table 2-1 shows the framework we used for the workshop discussion.

Table 2-1: Evaluation Framework used in the Collaborative Workshops

Programme Structure/Logic	Success Indicators	Performance Issues	Risks/ Assumptions	Recommend-ations
I. Mandate Objectives Stakeholders Beneficiaries				
II. Method Strategies Programme Components				
III. Resources/ Implementation Funding Staffing Organization Planning Management External Linkages				
IV. Results (expected & unexpected) Outputs (direct, immediate) Outcomes (from outputs) Impacts (from outcomes)				

These workshops assisted us greatly. We drew upon the insights of staff to:

- clarify, debunk or elaborate on field observations;
- assess the relative importance of topics we were examining; and

- explore options for future practice

At the same time, staff told us how much they appreciated the opportunity to participate in this manner, and how important it was for them to reflect on their activities to date. Had there been more time, we would like to have broadened this collaborative process to include more of the programme stakeholders: people at the neighbourhood and community level and the officials and technical staff at the municipal level. Sometime in the future AURP staff in the regions may wish to try this exercise with their implementing partners.

III. PROGRAMME CONCEPT, DESIGN, AND EVOLUTION

A. Programme Context

1. Geography and Culture:

Afghanistan is a mountainous, landlocked country nestled between South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East (see Figure 3-1, below). It shares a border with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Its surface area compares with that of France, Denmark and Switzerland combined.

Figure 3-1: Location of Afghanistan



The Country's socio-cultural diversity reflects its locale as the transition zone between three distinct regions of the world. More than thirty different languages from across five linguistic groups are spoken in Afghanistan. Persian and Pashto are the two most commonly spoken and constitute the official languages of the Country. Almost all Afghans are muslims (80% Sunni and 20% Shia). Culturally, these groups share strong, historic associations with Afghanistan's neighbouring countries.

2. *Economy*

While the people of the Region have roots extending 3,000 to 5,000 years in history, Afghanistan, as a state, is only about 100 years old. Up to the late 1950's it has been almost exclusively a rural based economy. In 1956 the Government adopted the first of a series of five year economic development plans. With substantial foreign aid/loan funds, Afghanistan developed basic infrastructure such as: roads, power plants and irrigation schemes. It also invested resources to increase agricultural productivity. On the social side, the government began developing the country's rudimentary health and education systems.

By the early 1970s Afghanistan had developed a relatively small industrial capacity in textiles, construction and agricultural services. Further growth in this capacity was compromised by the inability of successive governments to generate enough domestic revenue to finance Afghanistan's economic development. As a result, Afghanistan became increasingly indebted to its international creditors. On the social side, schools and universities had been developed, though only enough to serve a minority of the population. The health sector had also grown but remained largely a service for those living in or near larger urban areas.

3. *The Effect of War*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the beginning of 16 years of armed conflict. Today, Afghanistan is a shattered land. An estimated 16 million people are struggling to survive in a traditional economy that has been devastated. According to the 1994 United Nations Human Development Index, Afghanistan is the third poorest country of the world.

Political Fragmentation

Politically, the country is split into different political/military entities. Almost all are break-away groups of the *Mujahadeen*, the Islamic revolutionary movement that captured Kabul from the Communists in April, 1992. With the support of different international sponsors,

various factions are trying to strengthen their position with military force. At the time of writing, the government remains in control of only 3 to 4 provinces out of 30. Kabul, the capital has suffered more than any other part of the country. Large areas of the city are in ruins from intensive shooting, shelling, bombing and looting. Ethnic tensions have intensified with the fighting. The psychological toll on ordinary people is incalculable.

Economic Disruption

The economy has been heavily disrupted by continued conflict. The Country's GDP is now lower than it was 13 years ago. Even before the war, Afghanistan was one of the world's least industrialized countries. Most of the industrial infrastructure of the major cities has now been destroyed. Agricultural production has been impeded by the spread of more than 10 million land mines throughout the countryside. The movement of commodities and services is continually being disrupted by border closures and embargoes. Unable to make a livelihood, many Afghans have turned to the informal economy. A few have joined groups involved with the illegal production and sale of heroin and cannabis and the smuggling of goods between Pakistan, Iran and the five Central Asia Republics bordering Afghanistan (The Nation, January 1-2, 1996)

Social System in Collapse

According to UNDP studies conducted in 1993, the Country's health and education systems are in a state of near collapse. Schools, clinics and hospital buildings have been damaged or destroyed, and many teachers and health personnel have either been killed or have left the country. Health and Educational administrations are unable to maintain what facilities remain, or provide adequate salaries to their employees. Official figures show, for example, that primary school enrollment dropped 84% and primary school teachers declined by 75% between 1978 and 1993.

The Human Toll

Since 1978, more than a million Afghans have been killed, hundreds of thousands disabled and about seven million have been displaced either inside the country (approximately 1.5 million) or as refugees in Pakistan, Iran and other countries (between 5 and 6 million). A significant number of the displaced are war widows.

Resettlement

Since 1992, a large number of refugees have returned to Afghanistan, though more than three million remain outside. As refugees return, they tend to settle in the cities. Of late, this has made Afghanistan one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in Asia. According to

UNHCR, half a million refugees returned from nearby Iran between December 1992 and October 1995, and about 65% of them have stayed in the regional city of Herat despite the fact that most families had rural backgrounds. As a result of this influx, Herat's population is estimated to have doubled over this period.

Where water and sanitation systems remain functional in urban centres like Herat, their capacity to deliver services has been outpaced by the number of people requiring them. In many urban centres, however, municipal waste removal services have been discontinued and piped water systems have fallen into disrepair or failed altogether. For the most part, municipal departments are unable to collect tariffs to maintain these systems, and potable water has become contaminated by fluid wastes that seep into pipes or well sites. Revenues that are collected by municipal service providers are often used for military purposes.

Urban growth is largely unmanaged. People build where they can. Roads are often impassable, especially during wet weather. Pools of water, contaminated by fluid wastes, stand and encourage the spread of disease.

Box 1
Afghanistan Country Profile

- Surface Area: 650,000 sq. km (the size of France, Denmark and Switzerland combined, or slightly smaller than Texas)
- Population: 20.1 million (Source: World Population Prospects, 1994 Rev.)
- Climate: arid to semi arid; cold winters and hot summers
- Terrain: mostly rugged mountains, plains in the North and Southwest
- Roads: 21,000km, of which 4,550km is paved/graveled
- Life Expectancy at Birth: 42.9 yrs
- Population with Access to Health Services: 48%
- Population with Access to Safe Water: 21%
- Daily Calorie Supply (as % of requirements): 76%
- Adult Literacy Rate: 32%

Sources: Human Development Report, 1994
Internet Fact Sheet on Afghanistan

4. *The Resilience of the Human Spirit*

Despite these conditions, Afghan people are working individually and collectively to overcome the effects of poverty and destruction. The Evaluation Team recently observed a man and his son, surrounded by

the rubble of their street in Kabul, building a large swing for the neighbourhood's children to play on (see photograph in Annex I). We also saw a group of men in Herat, unprompted by any development organization, dredging an irrigation canal in order to restore the flow of water to their farmlands on the outskirts of the city.

Traditional practices of community problem solving still exist throughout Afghanistan. These practices can, as we observed in this evaluation, be nurtured both to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and to re-build trust between rival groups.

5. *Efforts to Assist the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan*

According to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) there were, by 1995, nearly 300 international and Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) either working inside the country or else assisting refugees.

The United Nations entered the picture in 1989. It anticipated that the Soviet backed Kabul regime would fall shortly after the Soviet withdrawal, and began an international appeal to cover expenses for repatriation and reconstruction.

Since that time, the UN has brokered peace talks with opposing political entities in an attempt to secure a lasting peace. At the same time various UN agencies have provided humanitarian assistance to vulnerable families, internally displaced families and refugees. In addition to UNCHS, the list of UN agencies includes:

- United Nations Development Programme
- United Nations Population Fund,
- United Nations Drug Control Programme
- World Food Programme,
- United Nations Children's Fund,
- World Health Organization,
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
- United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization,
- International Labour Organization, and
- Food and Agriculture Organization

The humanitarian assistance effort has been coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA), while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been assigned a central funding and coordinating role for UN rehabilitation and development activities.

Emergency relief remains an important feature of the United Nations and NGO effort in Afghanistan as a result of the continuation of armed

conflict. Yet, an increasing number of organizations, including UNCHS, are developing longer term approaches that minimize dependency and consider sustainability. These approaches hinge on the idea of tapping into existing systems of local problem solving and governance.

6. Actors in Afghanistan's Rehabilitation - an Overview

Figure 3-2 shows four key actors playing a role in Afghanistan's rehabilitation - three indigenous, and a fourth exogenous.

Figure 3- 2 Actors/Sectors in Afghanistan's Rehabilitation



The indigenous actors are the governments, the for-profit sector and the non-profit sector. The governments are several and can be usefully thought of at two levels. First, are the ruling bodies, the political-military entities that control a particular area. In each of the three regions where AURP is active - Kabul, Mazar and Herat - there are distinct ruling bodies. Second, are the civil departments managing urban and rural areas. These are largely local in scale - municipal, district (rural, urban) and neighbourhood - serving more of a managerial, local governance function than a political-military one; though they to are controlled by the political-military bodies in power in their region.

In the urban areas, the civil departments are the municipality, the district and the neighbourhood councils *(shuras)* and their heads (district head - *raeeseh naheeyeh* and neighbourhood head - *kalantar or*

wakil e gozar), and the technical departments running urban services. Some of these departments are attached to the municipality such as the Department of Roads, while others are semi-autonomous such as Kabul's Central Water Authority - CAWs).

The for-profit sector refers to the commercial activity that can be observed in all the main cities. For the most part these are informal, unregulated, small-scale production and trading activities rather than the formal, regulated, larger scale, company and factory-based activities. They are likely fueled by some combination of domestic demand for basic needs and the demands of the war and the trading of illicit goods (e.g. arms and drugs). Third, is the not-for-profit sector of civic, non-governmental and community based organizations (union and professional organizations, NGO's, CBO's etc.), sometimes known as the "civil society". These appear, currently to be very weak but they could be important players in the future, especially in the civic rehabilitation of the country. This sector tends to temper or balance government and market influences with those emanating from the population as a whole. Currently, while there appear to be a few NGO's who with some justification claim non-profit motivation, most who describe themselves as such are, in practice, private, profit motivated contractors.

The important exogenous players in Afghanistan's rehabilitation are the international aid organizations involved in activities that span the spectrum from emergency relief to development - the UN, bilateral and international NGOs (INGOs). The aid sector plays an important, if at times ambiguous and indirect role in relation to the three indigenous sectors. On the whole, the aid sector prefers an even handed, somewhat distanced relationship with the political-military bodies. Some relief and rehabilitation organizations establish a working rapport with the local civil/technical departments. The private, for-profit sector tends to benefit from the demands created by the aid sector for relief and rehabilitation inputs (e.g. house rentals, building materials, heavy equipment, food). In addition, there are private contractors who benefit through implementing aid projects. Many such contractors call themselves NGOs, and are called such by the international aid agencies, even though these organizations, for the most part, acknowledge the primary - for profit motivation of these NGOs.

Finally, there is an incipient non profit sector with NGOs and CBOs more deserving of the non-profit description that are supported by the international aid sector. These are discussed more fully later in the document.

B. Programme as Conceived in Programme Document and as Developed in Practice

The Afghanistan Urban Rehabilitation Programme (AURP) - AFG/93/002 - is based on a programme design document dated August 15, 1994. The document is signed by three parties: the Government of Afghanistan, UNCHS and UNDP. The Programme Document, which draws directly upon lessons learned in earlier UNCHS work in Afghanistan, serves as one benchmark against which to compare programme achievements. This section introduces the Programme logic and structure, and highlights some of the differences between what was conceived and anticipated and what is actually happening.

1. Time frames and Locations

The AURP started in January 1995, according to the schedule that was set out in the latest version of the Programme Document. Its duration is stated to be two years, however in the latest budget revision exercise, UNDP reallocated the programme's finances to cover a 27 month period, to the end of March 1997.

The Programme Document identifies 12 provinces in three regions of the country for programme activities. These regions overlap considerably with those specified for UNCHS's earlier work in Afghanistan. The document gives priority to programme development in the main cities of each region namely: Kabul in the Central Region, Mazar i Sharif in the Northern Region and Herat in the Western Region. In each of these cities, shown in Figure 3-3, AURP will establish Regional Support Offices (RSOs, now known as Regional Programme Offices or RPOs). The document leaves room for expansion to secondary towns as "security conditions permit".

In reality, Programme activities have been confined to three cities, and there are no immediate plans to initiate activities in neighbouring secondary towns. While the Programme has received requests for expansion both from neighbouring municipalities and from other UN agencies working in the region, most staff feel that they need more time to consolidate their programmes in their current locations before considering expansion. They also question whether the Programme's existing budget is adequate for such an expansion.

In a separate development, it was felt that there was a need to expand the activities of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme to Qandahar in the Southwest region of the Country. At present, UNCHS is completing a prefeasibility study for this scenario. Should it decide to implement a programme in Qandahar, it would be managed with additional programme and operational resources.

Figure 3-3: Map of Afghanistan



The Programme Document specifies that the AURP will be supported by a Programme Support Office (PSO) located in Pakistan. In fact, this office does exist in Islamabad, in close proximity to the UNDP's temporary Afghanistan Office.

2. *Problems and Opportunities Posed in the Programme Document*

The Programme Document sets out four immediate problems to be addressed by the AURP:

- Destruction of houses and infrastructure
- Overcrowding and pressure caused by the displacement of people
- The reduction in the capacity of the building materials industry
- The depletion in the quantity of urban management professionals and the breakdown of many urban management systems (AFG/93/002, Programme Document, p8)

Much of the supporting text for these problems centres on the perceived need to rebuild war damaged homes, both for refugees and for those who stayed in Afghanistan. Specifically, discussion of the problem emphasizes: damage to homes, the availability of building materials (such a timber and concrete), the heavily subsidized and therefore non-sustainable nature of previous government housing policies, the lack of credit and legislation to support investment in housing, and the lack of a skilled labour force.

This emphasis seems to reflect the objectives set in UNCHS's earlier programmes - AFG/90/008 Housing for Resettlement, and AFG/86/033 Research on Low Cost Indigenous Building Materials - more than it does the objectives of the current programme. The earlier programmes' objectives included:

- provision of building supplies to households, at cost price;
- improvement of production methods and outputs of private small scale building materials manufacturers; and
- the formulation of a strategy for the development of low cost land for housing

The achievements of these programmes and their relation to AURP are captured in Appendix V.

The definition of the problem in the Programme Document appears to be at odds both with the AURP's overall design and with the way the Programme has actually been implemented.

- First, relatively little emphasis is given, in the early part of the Programme Document, to problems associated with the infrastructure to support the development of housing such as: water supply systems, solid waste services, drainage systems, roads,

lane ways, culverts and bridges. This is the case even though the March 1992 Evaluation of these two programmes indicates that staff already recognized the importance of these problems and adjusted their programme to accommodate the reconstruction of supportive infrastructure.

- Second, the definition of the "problem" gives disproportionate emphasis to the role of the private sector in addressing the problem. In stating the problems and the opportunities for the Programme, the Document says very little about the role of communities and the public sector (e.g. Department of Water Supply) in urban rehabilitation, even though they feature prominently in the Programme's design and implementation.

The development objective of AURP, "to facilitate and support the indigenous process of repair and recovery in the urban areas of Afghanistan", seems to reflect a deeper understanding of the problem (and its related opportunities) than is stated in the Programme Document. It refers to the notion that rehabilitation is both a physical and a social development endeavour which attempts to rekindle and strengthen traditional practices of community problem solving. It is clear from the evaluation of the previous programmes and from interviews with persons involved in them, that this insight had already found expression in UNCHS's earlier work.

The Programme Document emphasizes a strong relationship with the local municipal government - suggesting it be nurtured to increasingly take over more fully the responsibilities for meeting basic service needs of the municipality. In addition, the Programme Document suggests a link with the private, for-profit sector not only in terms of the inevitable demands created in that sector by its activities, but also more proactively through construction and through promoting small-scale production and other income-generating activities such as in the building materials industry (e.g. the development of brick kilns). In practice, to date, this has been done to a limited extent through stimulating small-scale workshop-based production in such activities as hand pump manufacture, carpet and *geleem* weaving workshops. However, initiatives to develop the for-profit sector in the construction trades have not yet been implemented.

Unusual for international aid efforts, no equivalent emphasis is given in the Document to nurturing a non-profit sector. Yet, in practice, some activities in relation to the non-profit sector have begun. Examples are the community forums in Mazar (see Community Forums - Case Example in Section V.D.1), and attempts in all three

places to make sub-district (zonal) and neighbourhood organizations more genuinely community based and representative.

3. *Objectives, Outputs and Indicators*

Under the Development Objective, noted immediately above, the Programme Document specifies four immediate objectives as shown in Figure 3-4. Considered together, they convey both the physical and the social dimensions of urban rehabilitation. They also provide scope for short term "emergency" and longer term "capacity building" initiatives. The immediate objectives identify actors and decision-making processes at the local, district and municipal levels. They also situate UNCHS as a "partner" with these actors, rather than an implementor and therefore potential competitor.

The Programme Document specifies a set of outputs for each immediate objective. While the immediate objectives capture the spirit of the Development Objective, the Outputs fall far short. As Figure 3-4 demonstrates, these outputs emphasize the physical infrastructure dimensions of the Programme almost to the exclusion of the social dimensions; and the indicators or targets that are attached to these outputs - namely the number of sub-contracts let - leads the Evaluators to question how they, alone, can be used to assess performance in relation to the development objective.

The Evaluators recognize that they are not the first to make this observation of the Programme's design. The Report of the Internal Review Meeting Held at UNDP Afghanistan, February 14th, 1996, states that, "it was felt (by participants) that the indicators listed to measure progress (sub-contracts let, money spent,...) do not do justice to the process that is being followed."

We also note that a similar observation was made in the evaluation report of the AFG/86/033 and AFG/90/008, though with regard to the programme objectives. In the evaluators' view, "the objectives of the Programme could (have been) better described in terms of community development rather than simply housing." (Notes by Eric Dudley on the Evaluation of AFG/86/033 and AFG/90/008, p.6)

4. *Strategies*

The Programme Document sets out nine strategies which clearly indicate how the parties to the agreement intended to pursue the Programme's development objective. Key among these strategies are the following:

- use and refine a community development method already in use in rural Afghanistan which engages field workers and local groups in collaborative problem solving;

Figure 3-4: Structure of Programme Components



- be structured in a flexible, modular fashion where programme offices relate to each other at the regional, municipal and district level, and provide a vehicle for engaging local groups;
- begin work in the major urban centres of Afghanistan and then explore the possibility of expansion to secondary or market towns;
- primarily, focus on activities which nurture the traditional system of neighbourhood governance by: a) engaging elders in priority setting related to: water and sanitation, infrastructure materials production, access improvements (e.g. steps, retaining walls) and b) developing proposals to be agreed upon by the municipal departments;
- secondarily, focus on a limited programme of high priority municipal infrastructure repair and maintenance works which have a broad impact, relatively low cost, which can be implemented quickly, are at low risk from conflict, and which involve non-specialist technology; and
- while implementing the activities mentioned above, be intentional about building organizational capacity within municipal offices and within the municipal system as a whole.

Overall, AURP staff in the field have conceptualized their programs in a manner which is consistent with the development objective, the immediate objectives and the strategies. The organigram in Figure 3-5 illustrates how the Programme has been structured. The figure is divided into two spheres, Programme and Community, and shows three kinds of relationships: Programme Management, Community Engagement and Support/Collaboration/Service.

Programme
The heavy lines show the management structure of the AURP. UNDP (Afghanistan) is principle funder and coordinator, and UNCHS the implementing agency. The Programme Manager for UNCHS is responsible for a Programme Support Office (PSO) in Islamabad and three Regional Programme offices (RPOs) in Kabul, Mazar and Herat.

The RPOs and the PSO maintain a support relationship as depicted by the thin line. This relationship addresses: financial, logistics, procurement, programming and personnel matters. In programming, for example, the PSO assists the RPOs translate survey data into districts and neighbourhood maps for use in the Neighbourhood Action and Municipal Infrastructure Programs.

Other international development organizations, including sister UN agencies provide support to or collaborate with the AURP. This is usually coordinated at the Regional Programme level where there are

Figure 3-5: Organigram of AURP and its Partners



both formal and informal interagency coordination mechanisms in place.

Community

In the community sphere, the AURP interacts with four main actors:

- local (i.e. Afghan) NGOs or sub-contractors - to date, these tend to be service providers with technical expertise, rather than community/social development practitioners.
- Municipal/District Officials - these are the people responsible for civic governance at the higher municipal levels including: the Mayor, district presidents, managers and engineers from municipal utilities.
- Municipal/City Technical Departments - these are the public sector service providers who are responsible for water supply and sanitation, roads, municipal buildings, and other public services.
- Neighbourhood Representatives and Community Groups - The Neighbourhood Representatives are also known as *Wakil or Kalantars e Gozars.* Within each municipal district there can be as many as 30 sub-divisions called *gozars.* Each *gozar* typically contains between 50 and 60 households. In some *gozars* leaders are elected, in others they are nominated by the residents, or even the mayor or other higher government officials. In addition, some communities have organized themselves in neighbourhood *shuras,* or councils. These are usually comprised of the elders of the local communities who decide on priorities and ensure involvement and commitment of the said communities *vis a vis* project activities.

Traditionally, and to varying extents, the bottom three actors interact with each other to address civic issues. This interaction is the "indigenous process" which features in the AURP development objective.

In the organigram, medium lines representing "community engagement" link the Regional Programme Offices with the four actors introduced above with a view to nurturing the indigenous process of urban repair and recovery. Local NGOs/Sub-contractors are more peripheral to the process, playing more of a support role (as shown by the thin line).

5. Budget

The budget given in the Programme Document is $4,918,025. Figure 3-6 shows how this amount is allocated by main categories:

Figure 3-6: AURP Budget as Conceived in Programme Document



Three observations about the budget:

- Just over half of the budget is allocated to the first four categories: personnel, operations, equipment and training. Costs associated with the Program's administration, human resource needs and physical inputs are relatively high for logistics reasons. Continued armed conflict in Afghanistan hampers internal travel and the availability and movement of equipment and supplies. The UN has established Islamabad, Pakistan as a key access point for Afghanistan. In the case of UNCHS, the three Regional Programme Offices are supported by an additional Programme Support Office in Islamabad. In reality, Programme staff comment that even this level of budgeted support underestimates that which is required. The current status of the operations (e.g. duty travel, mission costs, vehicle maintenance) category, which is 96% spent at the end of April 1996, underlines this observation (see Table 4-1).

- Just under half (48%) of the total budget is set aside for field level activities (or sub-contracts). This portion is broken down into two envelopes, the Neighbourhood Fund representing two-thirds of this allocation, and the Municipal Fund. These funds are accessed by the Programme through a project approvals process described in Part IV. The bias in favour of the Neighbourhood Fund underlines the AURPs stated priority for engaging local communities in human scale infrastructure and social development initiatives.

- The personnel category represents 35% of the total budget and includes costs for national and international staff. A more detailed breakdown of the personnel budget illustrates the gap in resource allocation between these two groups. The budget allows 163 working months of time for international

professionals at a cost of $1,037,000, and 1,014 working months of time for national professionals at a cost of $327,750. This sets the value of the international professional at $6,361.96 per working month as compared to $323.22 per working month for the national professional. The implications of this disparity are discussed further in Sections IV and V.

IV. PROGRAMME PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Start-up and Establishment of AURP

1. Continuity with the Past

The Programme formally started in January 1995 and was to end in December 1996. In reality, the start date represented more of a transition and evolution from the earlier Housing for Resettlement (AFG/90/008) and Research on Low-cost Indigenous Building Materials (AFG/86/033) programmes. Much of the AURP's programme content (i.e. basic infrastructure repair) and methods (i.e. local level engagement with district and community organizations) originate with the Housing for Resettlement Programme. As the AURP continues to evolve, it benefits from the presence of national and international staff who began their work in the earlier programme.

In addition to the continuity provided through UNCHS - implemented activities, responsibility for urban water supply activities, previously implemented under a series of UNDP/OPS projects, was formally handed to the management of the AURP during 1994. In addition, UNCHS made a commitment to complete work already started on the Herat provincial hospital (with AETF funding). In this process of adopting previously initiated projects, UNCHS was also able to absorb a number of key professional and support staff in the Islamabad and Herat offices, which has provided a degree of continuity.

Notwithstanding, the benefits of AURP's continuity with its predecessor programmes have not been felt equally across the regions in the current programme. While the offices in Kabul, Mazar and Islamabad have retained key Afghan staff with previous UNCHS experience in the country, this is not the case in Herat. AURP is UNCHS's first main initiative in this city, and all staff members are new to the Organization's Afghanistan work. In Mazar, there has been some continuity. Two national staff members joined UNCHS in the previous programme. The new Regional Programme Manager had previously consulted to UNCHS's regional programme in the North and one of two UN volunteers in the previous programme in Mazar is now serving as the Programme Support Officer at the PSO in

Islamabad. In Kabul, the transition from one programme to the next has been virtually seamless. The National Programme Manager of the two previous programmes continued as the new National Programme Manager for AURP with additional responsibilities as the Regional Programme Manager.

2. *Start up Delays*

Herat experienced delays in the placement of their new Regional Programme Manager. The position was not filled until April. The late starts resulted, at least in part, from the delayed initiation by UNCHS of the recruitment process.

Other delays related to the release of programme funds, setting up of office space and hiring national staff hampered start up, particularly in Herat. Given the short, two year duration, of the Programme, such delays can have significant negative impacts on the quantity and quality of work. The fact that Herat now seems well on its way, despite delays, speaks well of the quality of the regional staff and its leadership.

3. ***Leadership Vacuum in Kabul***

In the meanwhile, the Regional Office in Kabul is facing difficulties with the move of the National Programme Manager/Regional Programme Manager to UNCHS Habitat headquarters in Nairobi, in December 1995. While the successor National Programme Manager was in place in February 1996, the recruitment procedure for the newly separated Regional Programme Manager position in Kabul has only recently been started. This turn of events has left a leadership vacuum in Kabul, which has been made more significant by the four month absence of one senior national staff and the departure from Kabul of the other.

For the past five months the office has been run by two national staff who, while competent in their own fields, are relatively inexperienced in programme management. The loss of the key people mentioned above has left the remaining team members feeling somewhat isolated. The evaluators strongly endorse the current efforts of the National Programme Manager to rapidly fill the Regional Programme Manager position.

B. Organizational Structure, Staffing and Procedures

1. *Organizational Structure - Programme Level*

The AURP organizational structure (as depicted in Figure 3-5) reflects its close association with three other types of organization:

- international agencies - i.e. UN, other development/donor country agencies, and International Non-Governmental Organizations - INGOs;
- municipal and city departments - i.e. technical/service providing organizations such as departments of water supply, roads construction, area-based organizations such as the Mayor's office, District Presidents (also known as *Raeeseh Naheeya*), and Neighbourhood Representatives (also known as *Wakil e Gozar or Kalantar e Gozar*); and
- national NGO's/private contractors.

The Programme Support Office in Islamabad, where the Programme Manager is also currently based, liaises with international agencies and their representatives who are based outside Afghanistan. Primary among these are the UNDP and other UN agencies such as United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Food Programme (WFP). The PSO also liaises with UNCHS headquarters in Nairobi. International staff in the regional offices, in addition to managing the regional programmes, interact closely with the same agencies and other international relief and development organizations that are active locally. International staff, along with their Afghan colleagues, also liaise with local departments and the local NGO's/ contractors.

2 *Organizational Structure - Regional Programme Level*

The organigrams of the regional offices (provided in Appendix VI) to varying degrees accurately represent the organizational structure of each office. Each regional office is headed by an international staff person (in Herat by the Deputy Programme Manager, and in Mazar and Kabul, by an Assistant Programme Manager - the Kabul position being currently vacant). This person works closely with one or two local staff who have the designation of Senior Programme Assistant.

In each regional programme, the rest of the office can be further loosely divided into three broad groupings: a technical section, a community development/liaison section, and an administrative/ finance section. In all cases, the technical section is the largest, and is staffed mostly by engineers. These professionals are responsible for the technical work related to such areas as water supply, access improvements and waste disposal. This section also includes a mapping office. The community development/liaison section consists of one to two persons, as does the

administrative - finance section. In addition, there is a support staff comprised of secretaries, drivers, guards and office caretakers.

3. *Staffing*

Balancing Technical with Social Skills
The preponderance of engineers, while appropriate to the technical work of the Programme, appears to understate the significance given in the design to community development aspects of the programme. For the most part, the engineers appear fully committed to working with the community and appear to be good at it. In collaborative evaluation workshops held with the staff of each office, the Evaluators noted overwhelming endorsement for the idea of a balanced social-technical approach to rehabilitation. At the same time, all regions acknowledged the need to strengthen their community development capacities by hiring more staff with academic and/or experiential qualifications to do the job.

Hiring Women
Staff also acknowledged the need to hire some women. Out of a total national professional staff complement of approximately 40 persons, there are only four women. Two of these work in community development roles (in Mazar), and two work in mapping (one in Kabul, one in Islamabad). One of the Mazar women also holds a management function and is involved in overall planning decisions.

Hiring women would require a special effort, since not many women currently work in such roles in Afghanistan. In what is perhaps a more extreme example, the Taliban government operating in Herat expressly forbids women from working with men. In this case, if the Programme were to hire a woman she would have to work in separate quarters. Overall, given the pressing needs of women in the community (particularly widows with children) and given the difficulty an all male staff face in reaching them, Programme staff feel that such an effort is worth making.

Certainly the dividends appear high as evident from the apparently successful work in Mazar with women's Community Forums. Unfortunately, it appears one opportunity may have already passed to hire women community liaison staff in Kabul. Two such positions were recently filled by men. Future opportunities should be taken in Kabul.

The Mismatch between Job Descriptions and Responsibilities
The staffing structure and designated positions originally designed, do not always meet the current needs of the Programme offices. While the

Programme has attempted to adapt the positions to the needs, the deviations between the two have sometimes been significant enough to make this approach problematic. In one situation, for example, the person responsible for the RPO's financial administration is actually listed in the staffing structure as a clerk. In another situation a person operating as a mapping technician and occasional accountant is listed as a secretary.

Quite apart from the psychological effect these kinds of anomalies may have on one's sense of self, there can also be salary implications. Indeed, there are some serious imbalances in the salary structure of some staff positions. In one office, for example, the two persons currently in the most responsible management positions are also among the lowest paid.

Salary Scales for National Staff

The General Services (GS) contract arrangement under which Afghan staff are hired has a salary scale which is perceived by some staff not to be competitive. The Evaluators encountered several staff claiming that good people could not be kept or attracted because other UN agencies were offering higher salaries for the same level of work.

In one of the Programme regions visited, a representative of a UN agency informed us that their organization was being restructured. It would be given fewer, but higher paying local staff positions under the alternative scheme, the National Professional Project Personnel Agreement. He cited a salary scale and a qualification level that suggested these new positions may be very attractive to some key people in the AURP office in the same city.

It should be pointed out that there are trade-offs between the two contracting schemes. In the GS scheme, comparatively lower salaries come with benefits and relatively more job security. In the NPPP scheme relatively higher salaries come without a benefits package and there is less job security. We have not been able to analyze the relative merits of these two systems, though it seems this needs to be done, preferably with broad staff participation, before any subsequent UNCHS programmes are started in Afghanistan.

On a different note, some Afghan staff expressed a concern that the purchasing power of their salaries was rapidly eroding. They believed this resulted from some combination of the devaluation of the Afghani currency, the way their salaries are pegged to the US dollar and the exchange rate used by the UN. The evaluators could not verify these impressions with the UNDP finance section. However, the concern was expressed often and strongly enough by Afghan staff to

suggest that this is a matter that might affect staff morale and performance, and therefore needs to be examined and addressed.

The Time it Takes to Hire Staff
Generally the recruitment process for national staff appears to take a surprisingly long time. In Herat for example, the final set of staff vacancies still remain to be filled even though interviews for these positions took place this February of this year (Herat Status Report April 1, 1996). Delays appear to be both the result of late starts in the hiring process as well as the multi-step hiring procedure which in part, no doubt, results from the need to demonstrate transparency and due process.

In some instances, however, rules about advertising jobs and interviewing all applicants, may not be reasonable in practice. Support staff positions (e.g. drivers and guards), for example, attract vast numbers of applicants - all desperate for work. In these situations friends and relatives can, and do, exert pressure on the agency to hire particular people. Justifying a particular choice of candidate becomes very difficult when the deciding factor is often an intangible such as "reliability". Practically, this information can only come from the reference of someone else trustworthy.

In sum, while transparency in recruitment may be a good principle on paper, it seems to have three major problems: a) the time required to complete the recruitment process; b) the time taken away from other work by staff to respond to enquiries, and interview and hire candidates, and c) the raised expectations and hard feelings a job competition can create in a community. In one hiring process, for example, a Regional Programme Manager mentioned being threatened by dissatisfied applicants and their supporters.

4. Differences between International and National Staff
When it comes to salary scales and benefits (e.g. access to the UN staff houses), there is a wide gap between international and national staff (see Section III, observations about the budget contained in the Programme Document). While common in development programmes like AURP, this gap may not be commensurate with any gap there may be in ability between the two groups.

The gap in salary scales can affect performance, morale and a team spirit between the international and local staff. Awareness of such disparities becomes particularly acute when the Programme is constantly invoking issues such as equity and a common humanity.

Certain structural divisions between national and international staff are difficult to address, at least in the short term. For example, international staff may be less subject to pressure from locally powerful Afghan interests, and may therefore be better placed to take (or appear to take) the major decisions. As senior heads of their respective agencies, international staff inevitably associate informally among themselves and in the process make many important decisions together. Afghan counterparts are not usually privy to these informal networks. Finally, the wide salary scale differences are unlikely to be bridged significantly, at least in the foreseeable future.

International staff need to be cognizant of the wide disparities between themselves and their Afghan colleagues, who are ostensibly their counterparts. The "counterpart" relationship needs to be energetically fostered in order to mitigate disparities like the ones mentioned above. Personal interaction should be predicated on politeness and a shared belief in equality and mutual respect. National and international staff should nurture a partnership approach to planning and decision-making. There should also be some reasonable system of informal benefits, rewards and privileges that not only go toward bridging the gap between the international and local staff but also compensate national staff for the extra responsibilities that a counterpart approach devolves to them.

Having said all the above, it is to the credit of both its international and local staff that the AURP has attracted and kept, over so many years, so many excellent and highly committed Afghans. This is especially remarkable given that so many similarly able Afghans have chosen instead to leave the country.

C. Funding Structure

AURP, as indicated in the Programme Document, was set up with a core budget of $4,918,025 to be spent over two years. It was expected to attract additional funding from other agencies, both within and outside the UN system. The core funding, for example, included funds for ten pre-feasibility studies. These studies were to prepare priority infrastructure works that could be presented by the Afghan government for external funding. While this particular vehicle was never used, the AURP has nevertheless been successful in attracting additional funding.

1. Core Budget

The initial core budget of $4,918,025 has been added to on a cost-sharing basis by other governments. Early in the programme Australia contributed $66,425. By February 1996, the U.K., through its ODA

programme, contributed a further $345,000. In the meantime, the initial core budget was re-phased to cover 27 rather than 24 months, extending the programme from a December 1996 to a March 1997 end date.

Table 4-1 compares, by budget line, the original allocation with the February 1996 revisions. The revised budget of $5,485,496 reflects an increase in all budget lines except operations which continue to carry a disproportionately high share of the original budget cut. A recently approved Netherlands cost-sharing contribution of $310,096 is not included in the budget table since funds have not yet been released.

As the table illustrates, the proportions allocated to each line item of the total budget also changed with the February revision. The gap between the budget allocated for project/sub-contracts and for other activities widened somewhat. As of February 1996, 55% of the budget is designated for personnel, operations, equipment and training, while 45% is set aside at the neighbourhood and municipal level for project or sub-contract work (termed sub-contracts to reflect the intended method of project implementation). The figures in the original budget were 52% and 48% respectively.

Personnel salary allocations are the highest at approximately 39% of total allocations, while training is the lowest at 2% (the personnel category was allocated 34% of the total in the original budget). In project allocations, neighbourhood level expenditures are expected to be over twice those of the municipal level, at approximately 31% and 14% of the total respectively (it was exactly twice in the original budget - 32% and 16% respectively).

As of today, more than half way through the Programme, only about 37% of total allocations has been authorized for disbursement. Of total allocations for sub-contracts, only 25% has been authorized, within which only 21% of the total allocations for neighbourhood subcontracts have been authorized. Training budgets have been least used (under 11% of total allocations). Both the amount and the pattern of the low authorizations, to date, is significant given the advanced stage of the Programme and given AURP's emphasis on neighbourhood level activity and capacity-building through the training of Afghan counterparts.

A combination of factors appear to have contributed to this slow utilization of funds. These include: the success in obtaining and using funds from other sources (to be discussed next), the delayed start of the Herat programme, the slow preparation of project proposals and their slow approval and funding authorization.

Table 4-1: Core Budget Allocations 1995 - April 1996 and Expenditures Authorized to Date

CATEGORIES	ALLOCATED (PROGRAMME DOCUMENT)	% OF TOTAL	REVISED ALLOCATION Feb.`96	% OF TOTAL	AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES (Jan-Apr.`96)	% OF ALLOCATED AUTHORIZED
	$1,785,525	36.31%	$2,113,000	38.52%	$995,347	**47.11%**
Operations	$147,000	2.99%	$156,500	2.85%	$151,124	**96.56%**
Equipment	$495,000	10.07%	$655,000	11.94%	$270,518	**41.30%**
Training	$90,000	1.83%	$110,000	2.01%	$11,800	**10.73%**
Sub-contracts	$2,400,000	48.81%	$2,450,996	44.68%	$623,355	**25.43%**
Neighbourhood	$1,600,000	32.54%	$1,690,996	30.83%	$358,578	**21.21%**
Muncipal	$800,000	16.27%	$760,000	13.85%	$264,777	**34.84%**
TOTALS	**$4,917,525**	**100.00%**	**$5,485,496**	**100.00%**	**$2,052,144**	**37.41%**

NOTE: * Allocations are an Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) for the period January 1995 - December 1996. * 18 projects are under preparation which if they are approved in the next few months will significantly increase claims on the allocations. However, an approved Netherlands contribution of $310,096 has not been included because it has not been released. This will raise the allocated amount.
SOURCE: * UNDP (1994) "Programme Document, AFG/93/002 Urban Rehabilitation Programme", pp. 19 - 20. * Programme Support Office

Some of these factors are surprising given that both the Kabul and Herat programmes have, at one point or another, been lacking funds to implement projects. Note, however, that there are 18 projects already endorsed by the Rehabilitation Steering Committee (RSC) and moving their way through the rest of the approvals and funding authorization process (this process is discussed in Section IV.D.4 and outlined schematically in Figures 4-2, 4-3).

There is, however, a decision to be made between developing project documents quickly to achieve this movement (this may require heavy and continued reliance on the PSO rather than the RPO and especially its Afghan staff in most of the instances), and using the opportunity to train Afghan staff to do project documents (slowing the process, at least in the short term).

2. *Additional funding*

As indicated above, part of the reason for the slow utilization of the core budget - has been the admirable success of the Programme in attracting additional funds. Table 4-2 shows that, overall, additional funds from other UN and external agencies amount to $2,696,065 which is 55% of the original core budget of $4,918,025. To date donors include: the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, and UNHCR.

Table 4-2: Funds by Source, January 1995 - April 1996

Source	Amount	% of Total
UNDP	4,918,025	64.6
Other UN	291,337	3.8
External	2,404,727	31.6
Total	**$7,614,089**	**100.0%**

Note: Includes the Netherlands contribution of $310,096 approved, but not yet released.
Source: Programme Support Office

Following a tradition from the earliest days of active UNCHS operations in Afghanistan, contributions -in-kind represent a significant input to the field activities under the AURP. Principally in the form of responses to immediate needs in the field, such contributions have been made either through the AETF (from the US and UK), directly from UN agencies (e.g. UNHCR, UNICEF) or through INGOs (e.g. NRC/NCA). Examples include the provision of large amounts of emergency plastic by bilateral agencies and UNHCR for weatherproofing homes during the winter of 1995/96. There is little doubt that these inputs have gone a long way to bolster the credibility of the agency in the field, while supporting the wider objectives of the Programme as a whole. In this and other contexts, UNCHS

programme staff have seen themselves as "brokers" between the aid community and beneficiaries, in line with the framework concept of the programme design.

The presence of additional funds and in kind contributions has made the use of core funds less urgent. For much of the early part of the Programme, the Kabul office was kept busy with funds from the Kabul Emergency Programme (KEP) totaling $260,000. In Herat, about 25% of the Programme's funding has come from bilateral sources. These funds were the mainstay of the Programme in the initial months of activity. Projects for core funding have now begun to move through the identification, documentation, and approvals process (see section IV.D.4).

Some Regional Programme Managers report that they have vigorously pursued non-core, bilateral funds, because this funding source has been more easily accessible than the core project budget. The latter requires a project documentation and approvals process that appears both more complex and slower (see Section IV.D.4, below).

It appears, however, that the emergency appeals process described above is also subject to bottlenecks. Donor funds pass (at least in paper form) through UNDP headquarters in New York and then through UNCHS headquarters in Nairobi before they can be spent in the field. Delays in processing are therefore inevitable. A UNOCHA official noted that processing time can take up to four months - an inordinate amount of time, especially given the emergency nature of projects being funded.

D. The Programme and Project Process: Planning, Development, Implementation, Maintenance and On-going Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

The AURP aspires to a consultative process through which to systematically develop and manage the Programme and its specific project activities - from conceptualization down to on-going monitoring and the maintenance of projects. Consultation is expected to involve all levels: from the national Programme level down to neighbourhood residents; among RPOs and the PSO; among all staff in any one RPO, and between the RPO and counterparts in the municipal and neighbourhood organizations.

The extent to which the above process has been achieved varies. In some cases it is more ad hoc, implicit and top down; in other cases, it is more systematic, explicit and based on a shared understanding among those involved.

1. *National Programme Level Processes*

At the overall national and intra-regional Programme level, the previous National Programme Manager was the driving force behind AURP's on-going conceptualization, planning, and development. While he gave each region autonomy to plan and implement its own programme, he also served as the interface between the RPOs, between the RPOs and the PSO, and between the RPOs and the external agencies such as the UNDP and UNCHS.

Through his personal energy, commitment, and communication skills, the National Programme Manager was able to resolve issues and keep programme funding flowing while at the same time encourage some degree of shared understanding of programme concepts, objectives, and methods across the Programme Offices .

It is not clear, however, that he was able to institute a framework - a structure and process - for planning and evaluation that could bring together the regional staff on a systematic and regular basis to discuss and develop the national programme and to resolve inter-office issues. No such framework existed at the time of the evaluation. The 1994 Programme Document, which ostensibly serves as a benchmark for planning the programme was only occasionally referred to by staff during the evaluation. Further, at the national and regional programme levels, there is no current planning document explicitly tying the immediate objectives and their associated activities together with a workplan and schedule.

At the same time, the RPOs do not appear to have precise budgeting information on which to plan their activities for a given period of time. Rather, they rely on developing project proposals or sub-contracts for funding. The programme plan is simply the sum total of projects at any given time that have been approved for funding.

In this regard, the PSO has a broad budget sharing formula of approximately 40%, 30%, and 30% of sub-contract budget to Kabul, Mazar and Herat respectively. Neither this formula nor the actual sums involved appear to be clearly understood by the RPOs. For example, both Mazar and Kabul were recently surprised to be told by the PSO that they had overspent particular budget lines for the period in question.

2. *Regional Programme Level Processes*

All three Regional Programme Offices have consultative and planning processes, though their degree varies from office to office. Mazar appears to have the most explicit of such systems. The office maintains

regular fortnightly staff meetings, periodic group consultations and one-on-one consultations between the international staff person and her counterparts. There are informative news items, reports and illustrations on the walls of the office that inform each individual staff member and groups working on specific components of the regional programme about what their colleagues are doing in other components of the programme.

Mazar also appears to have the most clearly articulated programme concept and working method which it is implementing with some success. Here too, however, it is not clear to what extent all this is driven by and depends on the international Regional Programme Manager and to what extent it has been internalized by the rest of the staff.

One hopeful sign in this regard, not only in Mazar but in all Programme offices, is the enthusiasm and ability demonstrated by the Afghan staff for engaging in a collaborative process of conceptualization, planning and management. This was evident in the collaborative evaluation workshops carried out at each RPO and at the PSO as part of the evaluation process (see workshop results in Appendix IV). Without exception, each office grouping expressed the need for such workshops on a more regular basis as part of a more explicit and collaborative planning system. The Evaluators fully endorse initiatives being taken by the current National Programme Manager to establish a broad-based Programme Management Team.

3. *Municipal/Neighbourhood Level Processes*

At the municipality and neighbourhood, and especially within the domain of the individual project or sub-contract, there appears to be a more systematic planning and implementation system in place. There is a broad working method with which to engage municipal and neighbourhood counterparts. There are also systems and procedures for UN approvals, authorizations, documentation and monitoring.

The working method remains largely implicit and its application varies with each RPO. It continues to evolve. The approvals process is largely a response to the accountability demands of the UN system, and is more explicitly laid out, albeit in various documents. In practice, the approvals process is actually two processes. One is the project approvals process proper, where documents are screened and approved on technical and financial grounds. The other is the process by which AURP requests UNCHS-Nairobi's authorization to disburse funds into the field. Guidelines for the actual project approvals process are set out in the annex to the Programme Document; however, the Evaluators did not encounter any such guidelines for the fund authorization

process. It was only through piecing together information and having it cross-checked from various sources that the evaluators could lay out the entire approvals process in the detail required to guide implementation (see Figures 4-2, 4-3, and Tables 4-3 and 4-4). We have subsequently been informed that several briefing workshops with senior programme staff have been organized on this issue.

The municipal and neighbourhood project planning and implementation process can be divided into three stages. The first and last - planning and implementation - engage the RPO and their municipal and neighbourhood counterparts. The intermediate stage of obtaining project or subcontract approval and the authorization to release funds involves the RPO, but often to a greater extent, the PSO and the UN system. The implementation process is diagrammed in Figure 4-1.

Project Planning Stage

The project planning stage begins with a situation analysis of the city and its neighbourhoods. This allows Programme staff to identify priority issues, areas, and projects. It involves both technical activities such as mapping, social and engineering surveys as well as interaction through meetings and group discussions with municipal, district and neighbourhood organizations and their representatives. Mapping as a tool for planning and analysis is particularly advanced in the AURP. Its use ranges from the more conventional topographical and engineering applications to the more community-oriented ones. Community field staff together with neighbourhood representatives use maps, for example, to locate, diagnose and develop solutions to problems in their immediate area.

Box 2
Gathering and Plotting Information on Maps - Example from Kabul

The objective of the mapping section (Kabul Office) is to provide the basis for discussion with the community. In every area of Kabul where UNCHS works, they prepare maps first. The Program has now chosen to work in Districts 1, 2, 3 and 6 because they are either the most war affected or the most heavily populated. These parts have now been surveyed. The methodology used is as follows:

1. Programme Assistant for Mapping and Assistant divides the district into 4 to 6 zones (each covering 5 or so *gozars*)
2. Staff do a walkabout survey of: war damage, location of drains, hand pumps, wells, springs, standpipes, roads and lane ways, clinics, mosques, schools, etc. This takes 1.5 to 2.0 months per district for two people
3. Staff recruit a *Wakil e Gozar* from each zone to administer a demographic survey
4. The *Wakil e Gozar* hires 4 or 5 people (using Food for Work) within his neighbourhood to help him do the surveys

Figure 4-1: Municipal and Neighbourhood Project Planning and Implementation Process



Note: this flow chart conveys the working method in a generic form. Its use in the field varies in each city with each project.

Box 2 Continued

5. Staff carry out reliability checks on the *Wakil e Gozars* work
6. Staff collect the data from both types of research and tabulate it.
7. The Programme Assistant for Computers and/or the mapping section of the PSO in Islamabad set up maps for each district, plotting all information gathered.
8. The maps (which can be broken down by district, zone or gozar) are then given to each section within the Kabul office, to the District Office and the Wakil e Gozars, as well as to other agencies working in Kabul. Other agencies also seek this information.
9. The maps then form the basis for District Action Planning.

(See also the fold out sheet in Appendix VII, for visual description of mapping process)

Note: The Software - MAPMAKER - used for mapping in the AURP was developed by Eric Dudley for the Programme. It is now available for general use. For more information, contact Eric Dudley at 64 Tenison Road, Cambridge, U.K. CB1 2DW. tel. 44 1223 367854, fax 44 1223 350349, email eric@dudley.win-uk.net. The MAPMAKER software can be downloaded over the internet using either FTP (ftp.win-uk.net/pub/users/mapmaker/mmzip.exe) or via the World Wide Web using: http://www.lbmcug.co.uk/~Mapmaker/

In some cases where neighbourhood organizations are weak or nonexistent, the promise of project activity and the community mobilization activities of the RPO staff result in such organizations being revived or formed. It may simply require the demonstration effect of successful community activities in the next *gozar* or district to spark interest. In Kabul, for example, the successful completion by 60 local residents of gabion (wire mesh and stone) reinforcements along the banks of the Kabul River has stimulated the interest of residents in the neighbouring *gozar* who also face periodic flooding problems.

Municipal and neighbourhood organizations interact with each other through technical activities. Periodically, engineers with various technical departments within the municipality conduct surveys or carry out technical designs and costing on proposed municipal infrastructure projects. The Programme encourages this kind of technical engagement seeing it as a way to build both the capacity of these institutions and their credibility in the public realm.

The character of the project planning stage varies from one situation to the next. At one end of a continuum, the RPO may select a project from a "wish list" of projects that the mayor or the district or neighbourhood head has compiled. At the other end of the continuum, the RPO may encourage the formation of a neighbourhood organization that, through a local consultative process with the community, identifies projects. The evaluators have observed both scenarios. Both, it seems, can be justified in this programme though, in the end, the latter more forcefully captures the spirit of local engagement that is central to the AURP. Responding to a wish list may have strategic merits if the objective is to use the

resulting project as a means of building the foundation for a fuller engagement in the future.

The extent to which district and neighbourhood representatives are fully representative of the community, and especially of its most needy remains unclear. Some conversations we had with community members suggests that their "representatives" may not be adequately representing these interests. The RPO staff attempt to address this issue by having direct contact with larger groupings of the community.

While Programme staff recognize that each of the three indigenous sectors - government, for-profit, and non-profit - contribute to rehabilitation, AURP has chosen to work most actively with municipal, district and neighbourhood organizations and their technical departments. Where these sectors are concerned, the Programme has established a method of engagement that considers how programme activities build indigenous capacity. On the whole, it seems, the Programme has yet to embrace the for-profit sector in the same way.

AURP also appears to avoid working with the Afghani NGO sector. On the surface, this appears to be counter to the usual, contemporary international aid agency approach. Such an approach more typically leans toward the local NGO sector, or "civil society" and away from government - with the assumption that the former is more representative of the interests of the population, and especially of the needy groups. AURP believes, with some justification, that those Afghani groups calling themselves NGOs are largely profit-motivated construction contractors, calling themselves NGOs to attract UN and INGO work. AURP also believes that, for the most part, these contractor - NGOs are also unreliable and inefficient. It cites poor quality work done by these contractors for other international agencies.

Most UN and other international agencies we discussed this issue with agreed that many, if not all Afghan NGOs were really private, profit-motivated contractors with varying degrees of reliability and efficiency. A few, however, believed there were NGOs more deserving of the name with whom they worked. In Kabul, for example, a visiting NOVIB (a Norwegian NGO) representative informed us that in keeping with their mandate to strengthen civil society, they worked in partnership with the Afghan NGOs that they considered genuine. He defined such NGOs as those that had the interest and ability to work in community development projects assisting the poor, that could develop and efficiently implement good project proposals for such work with minimum supervision, and charged low overheads: as opposed to profit-motivated contractors who implemented projects

defined by others, charged high overheads, and needed careful monitoring. NOVIB also trains NGO personnel in project/programme planning and management, financial analysis, etc. The NOVIB representative considered the municipal officials and technocrats much less motivated, competent, and reliable. He and the local Afghan head of the International Red Cross Committee, described the leadership of the good NGOs as coming from the progressive, well educated elements of Afghan society - university professors and graduates, ex-government technocrats, business persons - for whom the NGO sector was a way to both earn a living and contribute to their country's recovery.

Box 3
Introducing Two Afghan NGOs Committed to Rehabilitation

The Kabul representative - Engineer Abdul Wasi Arian - of one of the larger Afghan NGOs , CHA (Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance), informed us that their NGO was established in 1985 doing emergency work and gradually began development work as well. They work in Jallalabad, Herat, Kandahar, and now in Kabul, in agriculture, education and training, health and physical infrastructure. They also run wheat-subsidized bakeries for WFP. In the recently opened Kabul office, they have 15 professional staff, five with university degrees. Other large Afghan NGOs include: COAR (Coordination of Relief Assistance) and DHSA (Development and Humanitarian Services Assistance. They are all based in Peshawar, where they share offices.

While AURP does not work with established Afghan NGOs, its work is beginning to go beyond the municipal civil authorities to help develop the CBO sector. The Community Forums in Mazar are an example of such activity. So are the attempts in all three programme sites to enhance neighbourhood and district level decision-making systems already in place.

Box 4
Ideas to Enhance Public Participation in Neighbourhood and Municipal Governance
- The Case of Kabul

On the premise that the *Wakil e Gozars* may not necessarily represent the interests of the people in their neighbourhood, the two District Liaison staff of UNCHS have proposed a new structure to improve accountability. If adopted by the Municipality (the idea is currently being reviewed by the Mayor of Kabul), this structure could alter the way development organizations, communities and the municipal authorities relate to each other. There are two key features to this structure. At the base, the idea is to divide each district into zones - each zone comprised of between two and five *gozars*. Within each zone, a Rehabilitation *Shura* would be created. This would be an elected body drawn from among the member gozars. *Wakil e Gozars* would then be accountable in a formal sense to their neighbours - not only within their own but also in adjacent *gozars*.

Box 4 Continued

The second feature is the Municipal Liaison office. This office would play a "clearing house" role and would connect the rehabilitation *shuras* with the municipal authorities, UN and other relief and rehabilitation organizations. Physically, there would be a space dedicated to this planning and decision making body. The space would contain agency offices and meeting rooms for coordination activities and district *shura* meetings. The Municipal Liaison Office would also contain a library for design and technical documents. It wouldn't require a big staff because all work would be carried out by participating actors.

Project or Subcontract Approvals Process

Programme staff access funds for projects from a variety of sources, including the AURP core budget. Arrangements are most often made at the regional level between the Programme and other collaborators, including: UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Programme (which provides food-for-work inputs) and assorted bilateral donors and international NGOs. RPO staff report that process of obtaining these resources is usually straight forward and relatively quick. The release of such funds can simply be obtained by preparing a memorandum of agreement between the AURP and the agency, and can be especially quick when the local representative of the agency is authorized to make the agreement.

In contrast, Programme staff report that the process of obtaining the release of core budget funds is considerably more complicated and time consuming. This process is described in the section immediately below.

In most cases, the benefiting community is also expected to make some contribution to the implementation of a project. A memorandum of agreement with the community recording the respective responsibilities of the RPO and the community is also signed by these parties.

Project Implementation

On release of the resources, the RPO can begin the process of purchasing the service and material inputs required to begin implementing the project. Regardless of the source of the resources obtained, careful records are kept and monitoring done of the inputs, their purchase, and use. This was evident from the RPO's ability in most cases to produce such information when requested by us.

Depending on the level of collaboration agreed upon by the parties, the implementation process is another occasion to engage the municipality and neighbourhood in the process of its own development. In this regard, the allocation of resources and responsibility for maintenance

of physical infrastructure and of services appears to be one aspect of this engagement that has yet to be fully emphasized. In many cases such responsibilities appear to remain with the RPO rather than with the benefiting organization (this issue is discussed more fully later in Section V.C.1).

4. The Project/ Sub-contract Approvals and Funds Authorization Process

When core budget funds are needed to finance a project, a series of steps are required to screen the project and to obtain authorization and the release of funds. These steps differ depending on whether the project budget request is less than $20,000, between $20,000 and $70,000, or above $70,000. The first two scenarios are illustrated in Figure 4-2. The greater than $70,000 scenario is not discussed since no project to date has been budgeted above this amount. At this time, the Programme intends to keep it that way, given the demanding nature of the procedure. In addition, there is the "blanket authorization" scenario. This is illustrated in Figure 4-3.

Projects below $20,000 are screened by an international donor community inter-agency Rehabilitation Steering committee (RSC). This RSC meets four times a year in Kabul, Mazar, and Herat. They screen the project to ensure that it neither duplicates nor contradicts other project initiatives undertaken by other agencies. The project is also screened on its own merits in terms of its basic content, feasibility and desirability. Programme staff prepare a one page project summary to accompany the presentation on the Project made by its exponent. If the project is endorsed by the RSC, the project document and MOA are prepared by the RPO and/ or the PSO, signed by the National Programme Manager, and UNCHS Nairobi is requested to authorize UNDP (Islamabad) to release the funds.

Projects $20,000 and above are required to pass through several additional steps. Upon RSC endorsement, contract documents and a draft MOA are prepared by the RPO and/or the PSO and reviewed by a Local Contracts Committee (LCC). The LCC meets usually within a week of being notified that a project is awaiting its review. It screens the contracts, focusing mainly on the financial aspects of the project. On LCC approval, UNCHS Nairobi is sent the project documents with a request to authorize UNDP to release funds. On receiving this authorization, UNDP is required to sign the project document and the MOA (unlike the less than $20,000 project that can be signed by the Programme Manager of the URP).

To speed up the project approvals and financing process, a "blanket authorization" route has more recently been devised (Figure 4-3). In

Figure 4-2: Approvals Procedures for Obtaining UNDP/UNCHS Funds for Programme Activities (Under $20,000 and $20,000 - $69,999)



UNDP/UNCHS Funds for Programme Activities (Blanket Authorization Procedure)



this case, project summary sheets are prepared each describing one of a bundle of projects, all of which together do not exceed $69,999 and individually remain below $20,000. These are submitted for consideration by the RPO to the RSC. In parallel, UNCHS (Nairobi) is requested to authorize the release of funds. On RSC endorsement, project documents and the MOA are prepared while the request for authorization is being processed. Once authorization is sent to UNDP, the Programme Manager can sign the project documents and request UNDP to release the funds.

As Table 4-3 (overleaf) illustrates, it takes on average 31, 64, and 44 working days from submission to LCC, to release of funds for projects below $20,000, between $20,000 and $69,999, and for blanket authorization respectively. The single most time-consuming step is the request for payment authorization by UNCHS Nairobi, which takes on average 31, 33, and 44 workdays respectively.

Table 4-4 shows the current status of projects/subcontracts in the approvals process. Currently out of 24 sub-contracts in the approvals process none are awaiting Nairobi authorization.

Table 4-4: Current Status of Sub-Contracts in the Approvals Process

	Regional Programme Offices			
Approvals Process	**Kabul**	**Mazar**	**Herat**	**Total**
RSC endorsed, preparing Project docs. for LCC	12	1	5	18
LCC approved, awaiting Nairobi authorization	0	0	0	0
Nairobi authorized, awaiting MOA from UNDP	0	0	2	2
MOA signed, awaiting UNDP cheque release	0	0	4	4
Sub-contract ongoing	1	15	6	22
Sub-contract completed	9	4	0	13
Total sub-contracts	22	20	17	59

Notes: Eight completed contracts for Kabul and four ongoing contracts for Mazar under AFG/90/008 budget. Not included here are 19 sub-contracts with external funds valued at $1,195,000
Source: Programme Support Office

Table: 4-3: Time Taken for Sub-contracts to be Approved

Steps in the Approvals Process	<$20,000	$20,000 - $69,999	Blanket
PSO Submits Sub-Contracts to LCC			
time taken	n/a	11 workdays	n/a
LCC Approves Projects			
time taken	n/a	6 workdays	n/a
Minutes of LCC Meeting Received by PSO			
time taken	n/a	2 workdays	n/a
PSO sends LCC Minutes/Request to UNCHS (Nrbi)			
time taken	31 workdays	33 workdays	44 workdays
UNCHS (Nairobi) Authorizes Payment			
time taken	n/a	7 workdays	n/a
PSO sends MOA to UNDP			
time taken	n/a	5 workdays	n/a
MOA Signed and Returned to PSO			
Number of Sub-Contracts Submitted	5	9	10
Number of Sub-Contracts Completely Approved	5	9	10
Average Time to Complete Approvals Process	31 workdays	64 workdays	44 workdays
Value of Sub-Contracts Completely Processed ($US)	$96,553.00	$288,439.00	$115,152.00
Notes:			
1. subcontracts with funds from previous project (AFG/90/008) not included			
2. subcontracts with revisions on project documents and memoranda of agreement are not included			
3. payment of subcontracts by UNDP Finance to the PSO takes 5-10 working days in all three categories			
Source: AURP - Programme Support Office			

5. *Coordination Processes Inside and Outside the AURP*

Internal Coordination

The three RPOs operate independently of one another, in large part because there are barriers to communication. Physically, the offices are distant from each other and ground travel back and forth is difficult given the security situation. Air travel is possible using the UN plane, but the trip is expensive and may require passing through Islamabad or Peshawar. Materials can be sent back and forth in the plane using the "pouch". Each office has a radio phone, but the quality of reception and the protocols used to transmit messages make it difficult to have a "quality" conversation. There is the option to use the sitor (a cross between a fax and a telex machine) but again this instrument is only really useful for addressing essential operational/logistics issues.

Daily communication is most intense between each RPO and the PSO. Pouches come and go and radio operators talk at each other across the "crackley" divide. Person to person interactions are at best sporadic. The National Programme Manager, and the Programme Support Officer travel from Islamabad to the regions on a periodic basis, and the Regional Programme Managers and other senior national staff occasionally come into Islamabad, though not ostensibly to meet with each other.

With limited opportunities for communication, the propensity for "communication breakdown" is high. Some tension has developed between the RPOs and the PSOs over the last fourteen months. At the risk of oversimplifying this tension, staff in the RPOs feel that the PSO doesn't understand the need for rapid responses to their requests. Conversely, staff in the PSO feel that the RPOs don't understand the constraints the Islamabad office is under. There may also be some conflicting ideas on role delineation between the PSO and RPOs. The limits to communication make it hard for staff in Islamabad and the regions to reach a common understanding on these matters.

Staff in all offices lament that they don't really know what is going on in other "corners" of the Programme. They would like to know more and warmly welcome the idea of a newsletter, the first edition of which is about to hit the press. They endorse the idea of a Programme Management Team to be comprised of senior staff from each office. In the same vein, they would also like to see collaboration between staff working in the same areas in the different offices. Staff in the PSO would welcome the opportunity to see slides of the programme's field activities and to discuss issues with field staff as they come through Islamabad. These and other ideas, if acted upon, would help to break

down communication barriers and forge more of an overall team spirit.

External Coordination
UNCHS is one actor among many providing humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. The number of "aid" vehicles on the streets of Mazar, Kabul and Herat is a testament to this substantial presence. Coordination, is of course, essential to ensure that these agencies do not trip over one another in the field.

Within the UN system, Afghanistan is known internationally as a good case study in inter-agency cooperation. There are two national coordinating mechanisms, UNOCHA and UNDP. Each have related, yet discreet, coordination mandates. They occupy opposite ends of the relief - development continuum, with some overlap in the middle. They cooperate on international appeals, and at the regional level are known to refer people and projects to each other.

Coordination takes place both formally and informally at the regional level. In all three cities, there is a functioning Rehabilitation Steering Committee (RSC). The RSC convenes four times a year and provides a forum for UN agencies to inform each other of their programming activities. For the implementing agencies of UNDP (e.g. UNCHS and UNOPS), the RSC also represents the starting point for obtaining UNDP project funding (see IV.D.4). Most agency staff interviewed find the RSC mechanism useful, particularly for information exchange.

In addition, each city has a series of sectoral working groups which bring together agencies and local/municipal departments working in areas such as health, water supply and sanitation. UNCHS in Kabul played a key role in starting these groups and today is a significant participant in the water supply and sanitation working groups of each city. These groups are able to delve into more detailed discussion than is possible at the RSC. In each city there are also other monthly or periodic UN and joint UN-NGO meetings to discuss security and logistics issues.

The evaluators were repeatedly told that these formal coordination mechanisms are only as good as the people participating in them. Where there is a spirit of friendship, trust and cooperation, these mechanisms work well. Part of the reason is that ideas and understandings can be built outside the formal strictures of the meetings so that when the participants gather around the table, much of the work has already been done.

The UN Guest House appears to be one central venue for socializing. It is also an effective informal venue for doing business. Two of the three guest houses have very pleasant grounds and inside leisure facilities, and the UN community in the third city is considering a move to a larger house with a few more amenities. At the moment, a cooperative spirit is clearly evident in all three cities. The only cautionary observation in this regard is that these informal networks can inadvertently marginalize Afghan staff who have little or no presence in these guest houses (see Section IV.B.4).

V. PROGRAMME RESULTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT

As discussed in the Introduction, the objectives of the Programme emphasize both the physical and the social dimensions of rehabilitation. In recognition of this, the Terms of Reference for this evaluation also speak of assessing both physical and process outputs. Consequently this section on "results" assesses both physical and social, output and process results of the Programme.

We begin with a broad, over-arching "result-in-progress". This is an emerging conceptual and operational framework for rehabilitation work. It is being articulated by Programme participants drawn from their experience with the Programme. We then assess the physical and social results of specific programme components at the two levels at which AURP works - the municipality and the neighbourhood. We end with assessing the extent to which all the above add up to achieving the basic developmental objective of the Programme namely, to "facilitate and support the indigenous process of repair and recovery". In each case, as appropriate, we assess outputs, outcomes, and impacts; the relevance of these, and their efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

A. Developing a Concept and Operational Framework for Rehabilitation

An important "result-in-progress" of the Programme appears to be an emerging, more fully articulated concept and operational framework for rehabilitation. The 1994 Programme Document speaks of "facilitating and supporting the indigenous process of repair and recovery", as a basic development objective. It then elaborates on this by describing the Programme in terms of four immediate objectives: a Neighbourhood Action Plan, Municipal Infrastructure Repair, Solid Waste Disposal, and Municipal Strengthening. The description and linking of these to specific physical outputs emphasizes the physical dimension.

In contrast, approximately one and a half years into the Programme, staff are developing what may be a conceptually and practically more

balanced and better articulated expression of the Programme. They are making the analogy with the human healing process after physical damage: likening "repair" to the physical repair of a damaged human body, and "recovery" to the healing - physical, social, and psychological - of that damage. Together these two processes add up to rehabilitation which is the basis on which the development process can begin.

As the practical companion to this concept, some staff overlay this physical and social process onto an operational 2 X 2 matrix. Figure 5-1 illustrates the matrix with sample projects.

Figure 5-1: Evolving Concept of Rehabilitation

	Processes	
Levels	Repair (Physical/Technical)	Recovery (Social/Institutional)
Municipal	Examples: • Begrami Water Supply Project (Kabul) • Joi Now and Joi Engeel Bridge Construction (Herat) • Road/ Access Improvement Project (Mazar)	Examples: • Office/Equipment Rejuvenation Water Supply Department of Herat City (Herat) • In Service Training of Water Department Engineers - Begrami (Kabul) • Feasibility study of water supply and sanitation systems in Municipality for Governor (Mazar)
Neighbourhood	Examples: • Self-financed *Karachi* System for removing household waste (Mazar) • Hand pump manufacture and training (Program Wide) • Steps and drainage improvements (Kabul)	Examples: • Neighbourhood Surveys & Focus Groups (Herat) • Community Fora (Mazar) • Organization of a Rehabilitation Shura (Kabul)

Along one dimension of this matrix the physical corresponds to the technical work to be done -improving access, water supply, repairing infrastructure etc. The social corresponds to the people, organizations, and institutions - city residents, their neighbourhood organizations, and their municipal institutions - with whom, and for whom the work is to be done. Along the second dimension of the matrix are the two

basic levels of human settlement at which this work is done - the "macro" municipal level down to the "micro" neighbourhood level. Linking the four elements - physical/ technical - social/institutional - municipal - neighbourhood - is the process of consultation: people of the settlement working together. This process yields not only the physical repair of the settlement but also the social recovery of its people, organizations and institutions. Through this process of consultation then, the foundations for further innovation and development are laid.

This "output" of the Programme - a well articulated concept and operational framework - has the "outcome" of offering a simple, more tangible, readily understandable, yet powerful view of both what the Programme is attempting to do, and how and with whom it is attempting to do it. It is a particularly bold and powerful view in a context characterized by emergency and war. In its elegant simplicity, the framework has the potential to mobilize a broad range of people into action around the notion of rehabilitation. It embraces a broad spectrum of external assistance from emergency relief to longer term capacity building initiatives. At the same time it signals that beneficiaries are collaborators rather than just recipients.

The potential in this way of articulating the programme was evident in some of the discussions ensuing around it: both in the forum of the collaborative evaluation workshops held with programme staff, and in discussions with people at project sites. In essence, this is an output no less tangible and perhaps more powerful than any of the physical outputs of the Programme alone could be.

B. Achieving Objectives, Obtaining Resources, Reaching Beneficiaries: An Overview

Table 5-1 summarizes the achievements of AURP in its first year. This information was compiled by Programme staff for its 1995 Annual Report. The Evaluators have added a few details based on information provided by staff.

Table 5-1: Summary of AURP's Achievements in its First Year (as reported by AURP)

Programme Focus	Achievement
Water Supply	• Improvement of water supply for 6,875,000 people • 1,200 hand pumps manufactured • 400 hand pumps installed • 14,000 wells chlorinated • Piped water supply systems repaired and improved • Testing for water quality
Sanitation	• Sanitation improvements for 4,550,000 beneficiaries • 79,000 cubic meters of solid wastes collected • 6,000 cubic meters of sludge material excavated • 70 solid waste collection points and systems established • 8,000 meters of ditches, culverts and drainage system improvements
Upgrading	• 228,000 people benefited from upgrading activities • 7 kilometers of primary and secondary roads repaired improving access to 54,000 people • 23 small scale bridges and culverts repaired or newly constructed improving access to 120,000 people • 1,072 stone masonry steps constructed, benefiting 42,000 people
Community	• Women's programme undertaken, 3,600 beneficiaries in community forums (training, day care and health services, income generation, community decision-making) • 500 graduates of training programmes (literacy, sewing, weaving, etc.) through community forums • 16,700 trees planted to improve environment
Mapping	• District and Neighbourhood surveys completed in all three cities • Basic urban information (e.g. sites and services) collected • Versions of city maps produced and distributed to Regional Programme Offices, municipal offices and other development and relief organizations.
Capacity Building	• Support to Municipal Systems • Establishment of a Liaison Office in Municipality • Support the parallel community and municipal programme line • Strengthening the indigenous institutional capacity

Source: AURP Annual Report 1995 and other Programme documents

1. *How Funds have been Allocated to Date*

As Table 5-2 indicates, Kabul is the biggest programme in dollar terms (35 major projects spending $947,625), followed by Herat (16 projects spending $570,069) and Mazar (22 projects spending $407,843). A more detailed breakdown of fund allocations is presented in Appendix VIII.

The four immediate objectives envisaged in the Programme Document - Neighbourhood Action, Municipal Infrastructure repair,

Table 5-2: Programme Components and their Funding by Region January 1995 - June 1996

COMPONENTS	REGIONS KABUL No. of Projects	$	MAZAR No. of Projects	$	HERAT No. of Projects	$	TOTAL No. of Projects	$	% OF TOTAL
Neighbourhood Action Plan	11	$206,773	16	$271,490	5	$104,995	32	$583,258	30%
Municipal Infrastructure	11	$223,046	4	$106,450	11	$465,074	26	$794,570	41%
Solid Waste Disposal	5	$106,852	1	$19,892	0	$0	6	$126,744	7%
Municipal Strengthening	5	$50,954	1	$10,011	0	$0	6	$60,965	3%
Relief	3	$360,000	0	$0	0	$0	3	$360,000	19%
TOTAL	**35**	**$947,625**	**22**	**$407,843**	**16**	**$570,069**	**73**	**$1,925,537**	**100%**
% TOTAL		**49%**		**21%**		**30%**		**100%**	

Source: Programme Support Office

Solid Waste Disposal, and Municipal Strengthening - have in practice been added to by a fifth - Relief. In pursuit of these objectives, AURP has attracted significant additional funding from other UN and external agencies - raising the AURP budget from its original core of $4,918,025 to its current level of $5,485,496.

Regarding the numbers of projects implemented and dollars spent to date, the Neighbourhood Action Programme makes up 30% of expenditures and the other three original objectives combined (all tending toward municipal level activity) comprise approximately 51%. The remaining 20% of expenditures to date (i.e. June 1996) are taken up by relief (one of the externally funded components not envisaged in the original Programme Document). This contrasts with the 2/3 to 1/3 ratio anticipated in the Programme Document between Neighbourhood and Municipal allocations.

Regarding specific projects and activity types: Hand pumps have used up the most resources (14% of total expenditures - under the Neighbourhood Action Programme objective) followed by sanitation (12% - under the Municipal Infrastructure Repair objective), and Sanitation (10% - under the Relief objective). Water Systems Improvements and Community Infrastructure are next with 9% and 6% of expenditures respectively.

2. *Beneficiaries*

For these expenditures, AURP estimates approximately 1,278,635 families as beneficiaries with a gross cost per beneficiary of $1.18 (using Programme expenditure figures to the end of April 1996). The Sanitation programme is estimated to reach the largest number of beneficiaries - 50% of the total, followed by access improvements and water supply (16% and 15%).

Regarding beneficiary counts, Programme documents generally do not specify how beneficiaries are determined. They do not indicate how the beneficiaries were identified and calculated, nor whether they are direct or indirect. As a result, the beneficiary count and per beneficiary costs must be treated with some caution. The Evaluators note that beneficiary analysis can be a very revealing activity for project/ programme planning purposes. In planning, for example, a study of the number and type of beneficiaries in relation to the input costs can help determine choices between options. Yet, to do it properly, requires some uniform discipline in the way it is applied in a programme.

C. The Municipal-Level Programme

1. *Engaging Municipalities in Urban Repair and Recovery*

Achievements

Results can be seen in improvements to municipal services and institutions. The Programme has contributed significantly to the repair, revitalization, and continuing operations of municipal services. By doing this through the active engagement of people working in these municipal services and in partnership with their institutions, AURP appears not only to be helping keep the skills in these institutions alive but, perhaps more important, their self-confidence, self-esteem, and hope. By encouraging collaboration between neighbourhood people and their municipal service providers in the joint delivery of services, AURP is fostering a climate of future accountability and mutual trust. This result is clear in several activities observed; and is in marked contrast to what we heard was the case before AURP.

Solid waste disposal is an example. Before AURP, and in places that AURP was not working, piles of rubbish lay uncollected: not only at the traditional central collection points but also haphazardly along streets and in front of houses. Residents had given up using the designated sites. In a number of districts in Mazar and Herat, where AURP had begun to work, we observed instead, municipal workers with their municipal trucks collecting waste at these central collection points, and residents taking the trouble to bring their waste to these sites, leaving their neighborhoods as healthier environments (see photos, Annex I).

Box 5
Engaging the Municipality...Waste Removal Project - Herat

The Department of Sanitation has a staff of 61. Approximately 30 work in waste disposal. They are organized in crews of six. There are five trucks, but at the moment only three are operative. Two crews are currently re deployed on street cleaning activities. The waste disposal crews pick up garbage from designated collection sites along the primary streets and deposit refuse at a site out of town. For this work, they receive food rations as a supplement to their wage. To date, the system is operating, albeit with reduced capacity due to the poor condition of the trucks.

Waste removal has been tried before by other UN agencies operating in Herat, but with only limited success. The Deputy Programme Manager attributes the success to date to the accountability system designed in collaboration with the Director of the Department of Sanitation. Fuel distribution for the trucks is controlled by a local agent, rather than by the municipality; procurement procedures guide the acquisition of spare parts and servicing for the dump trucks; and food allocations are carefully matched with the volume of waste picked up and dropped off. The accountability system is transparent - that is, key actors know what the criteria are and detailed record keeping shows any deviation. The system appears to encourage accountability between local actors rather than simply with the Programme.

In Herat a major access road into the city was being constructed by the roads department. AURP engineers were there assisting in the construction of the large culverts over which the bridges had to pass. In another part of the city, municipal engineers, unassisted by AURP, were surveying a large area in preparation for the possibility of a new residential area for internally displaced persons that AURP might assist in.

In Kabul, the Begrami water supply project promises to revive a major waterworks, bringing clean water to up to 400,000 families. The responsible party in this case is the Water Management Team of the city, brought together by AURP - two engineers and their two trainees seconded from the Central Water Authority (CAWs). The team is led by an expatriate engineer seconded to the Project from Oxfam UKI.

The Delicate Nature of the Work

In all three cities AURP's municipal support offices are located with the municipality offices, serving as symbols of this collaboration. Yet, despite the substantial nature of these achievements, they can be fragile. Municipal organizations are chronically under funded. Tariff revenues, if collectable at all, are insufficient to cover the costs of services. Employee salaries are generally below subsistence levels. AURP budgets pay for the repair of the municipal trucks and the fuel. Food for Work contributions make possible the availability of workers for driving the trucks, shoveling the waste, and digging the trenches. AURP organizational know-how helps streamline the efficient running of these activities. In Kabul, where AURPs budget for waste disposal has temporarily dried up (as AURP awaits the processing and funding authorization of its project proposal) waste is again piling up uncollected.

There appear to be four key ingredients to making these achievements more durable. First, for the present, project proposals and budgets for key activities must continue to flow keeping a continuity, confidence, and momentum on which to build. Second, AURP must seize training and innovation opportunities that promote increased effectiveness and efficiency. Third, the Programme must look for opportunities to open a policy dialogue at the municipal level to address the delivery of services in a planning context. Finally, AURP and its funders need to explore ways to address the poor salary conditions endured by the engineers and managers staffing the municipal offices. These are each addressed below.

Continuity in Project and Budget Flows
Interruptions in work are demoralizing for all concerned and erode the credibility of AURP and its partners among each other, and in the eyes of the community. Project proposals must be planned and processed, and funds authorized in a timely fashion to minimize such interruptions and project delays. This issue is more fully discussed in Section IV.D.4. Here we merely underline the wide-ranging implications of not acting on this issue.

Innovation and Training
Regarding innovation and training, AURP activities must be used as "learning grounds" from which AURP staff and their counterparts continuously ask themselves how what is being done can be done more efficiently and effectively - that is, doing more with less; and then training each other in these improved ways. For it is in this way that municipal services can be made more affordable - not only for AURP in the short term, but also for a municipality that will gradually wean itself off its need for AURP.

In Mazar, for example, AURP staff are already questioning why waste should be dumped on the ground, then shoveled up again on a truck while truck, truck driver, and waste-monitor stand idly by. Why not, instead, have the waste dumped in a trailer ready for hitching-up and removal by the collecting tractor. This may not be the best solution; but it is the attitude from which innovative solutions arise. In Kabul, the Waste Management Team has taken on two trainees from the Central Authority for Water - strengthening the skills this Authority will need when they have to run Begrami without AURP.

Opening up a Policy Dialogue
It is common practice for municipalities to sell urban services and municipal resources such as land at "give-away" rates. This is often done indiscriminately such that even those who can afford to pay do not. This practice leaves the municipality with no resources to provide adequately for the many truly in need. This problem was originally identified by UNCHS in the Programme Document. A policy dialogue will gradually have to be opened up between the municipality and the urban service departments to address it.

Box 6
The Absence of a Land/Tax Policy - Two Examples

In a newly developing residential area in Mazar, one recipient a middle-class restaurant owner explained that 100 M2 plots were "sold" by the municipality for Afs 28,000 (Afs. 10,000 = $1). The same land on the private market is worth millions more today, giving this man a huge windfall profit while depleting the scarce resources of the municipality.

In Herat, the Mayor is reluctant to consider increasing tariffs and taxes for services - citing this as a central government jurisdiction even though that government no longer holds sway in the province.

Land policy studies were budgeted in the Programme Document but as yet these have not been pursued. Perhaps a broader municipal finance study may be more appropriate.

A linked issue is for the municipality to organize its resources such that it can afford to pay its personnel a wage that will keep them and keep them working. The time for implementing some of these measures fully may be some time away. A modest start in preparation for that time can be made today. At the very least, such a start will make clear what can be done now to make it easier for fuller action later, and what must not be done now to prejudice such action later. An example of the latter may be the choices regarding urban form, discussed below.

Sensitivity may have to be encouraged among AURP staff themselves regarding the potential implications of their actions on urban form. The collaborative planning workshop in Mazar, among other things, made clear that AURP team's preference for encouraging a compact urban form rather than an urban sprawl which is expensive to service and eats into agricultural land. Yet, their graveling of primary roads servicing outlying and newly developing fringe areas threatens to encourage such sprawl. There may be a similar result from Herat's assistance to building major access roads at the fringes of that city.

Addressing the Poor Salary Scales of Municipality Staff
AURP field staff are quick to point out that it is very difficult to engage municipal engineers and managers in capacity building exercises when they are not getting paid enough to live on; and, on one level, they understand when their colleagues in the various municipal offices don't perform their roles, other than to come to work to sign in.

It is understood that the UN system cannot be supporting the salaries of municipal workers. Nevertheless if municipal strengthening is to

continue to be a serious priority for agencies like UNCHS/UNDP, then some measures need to be found to make it easier for municipal staff to come to work and perform their jobs. One strategy that can be implemented in the near term is to offer opportunities for training and skills upgrading with associated travel and career advancement potentials as rewards for collaboration. Another, smaller measure, used by Mazar and Kabul, is to modestly upgrade offices facilities, and provide essential equipment and supplies. A third possibility is to offer honoraria while officials collaborate with AURP. Some World Bank projects use this strategy.

D. The Neighbourhood Level

1. Rebuilding Community

AURPs activities in all three cities have encouraged neighbourhoods to work together with the Programme, and with the municipality, to rebuild a sense and place of community. This has been no easy task. Not only can neighbourhoods be physically shattered places, but their sense of community can be either entirely lost or severely eroded.

The original community of residents may have long fled with the original onslaught of war. With relative calm, some of them may have begun to return, while others beginning to inhabit the abandoned buildings may have come from disparate places. In neighbourhoods where residents clung on through the fighting and bombing, the traumas of suffering through may just as easily divide as bind. And yet, the indigenous will to rebuild both community and place remains strong (see photos in Annex I).

In neighbourhoods building on such a will, AURP staff enter with a message of hope of recovery. Their working method - engaging residents and their representatives at the neighbourhood and district level through dialogue, surveys, needs and project identification, project preparation, protocols of mutual implementation and maintenance responsibility and so forth - has been discussed earlier. The results are two-fold. First, there is a nurturing and strengthening of hope and therefore the will to do more. Second, there are the physical manifestations of this in physically improved communities - water taps, drains, steps, etc. These manifestations can, in turn, further nurture and strengthen the sense of community.

A User Pay System of Garbage Collection - Case Example

In one example from Mazar, residents have started their own user-pay rubbish collection system. This idea was proposed and developed by the residents themselves: to hire a donkey-cart owner (a *karachi* owner) to come at specified times at specified places to collect resident's

garbage and transport it to the collection points for removal by the municipality.

Before, the Programme the *Karachi* system was working in an *ad hoc* fashion. The municipality did not have the resources to maintain the system so rubbish was piling up on the street. Districts 3 and 4 were the first two to revive the system. Programme staff approached the District Presidents who in turn called the *Kalantars* together. In their *guzars* the *Kalantars* and Programme staff worked out how much each household would have to pay for regular pick up by the *Karachi* and where the central collection depot would be located. People were willing to pay the nominal pick-up fee but there was some controversy around where to place the collection sites. Nobody wanted the central site next to their house.

Each *Guzar* created its own contract with a *Karachi* who operates on a pick up schedule that is posted in the neighbourhood. AURP staff and the Kalantars monitor the programme. Today in District 3 there are 11 *Karachis* functioning. Other Districts are seeing the success of the Programme and are beginning to adopt it. Overall in the City 26 out of 106 *guzars* have a *Karachi* programme up and running. Generally these are the 26 most in need of such a programme, by virtue of the population density. More *guzars* are joining the programme every week. When asked what has made it possible for the *Karachi* programme to be revived, one of the Kalantars in District #3 said, "people weren't encouraged before the consultation. They were expecting service from the municipality". (See photos in Annex I).

Community Forums - Case Example
Another result of AURP's neighbourhood action is Mazar's Community Forums. To date there are two Forums in operation, a third in development and plans for six by the end of the Programme. The Community Forum is a meeting place for women in a district to participate in income-generating activities, obtain services, and be trained. Most important, it is a forum for the women to come together regularly to discuss and address the concerns of their neighbourhood, as viewed through their eyes. This is a significant development since only men can participate in the traditional neighbourhood representative organizations.

AURP provides six months support, largely for building rent, seed capital and a revolving fund. The Forum otherwise finances itself, and the services it provides thereon with earnings from its income-activities. Its income sources are production workshops - carpet weaving, tailoring, leather work, beauty salons etc. Its services include

a mother and child health clinic, a crèche, and literacy classes (See photos in Annex I).

Charges are levied for training people in production activities and for some of the services, but at a lower than market price and as means allow. One fifth of its earnings are distributed to those salaried by the Forum as a profit-sharing work incentive: the trainers, and some staff. The rest help run the Forum and can also be used in community projects outside the Forum. The allocation of this surplus is decided through a management team in consultation with the broader membership.

A management team of the women runs the Forum. This team is accountable to the membership who come together on a three-weekly basis. These meetings are open to all, and are apparently well attended (i.e. 70 or more participants). They are devotional, social and work events. Participants pray together, Forum leaders give financial and activity reports and then hold discussions/ consultations with the participants on current district or neighbourhood issues. At the end, simple refreshments are served. Participants bring a dish as means allow and share with each other.

From the accounts of the women participants, AURP staff, and professionals providing services (e.g. medical), the Community Forums are a good place to "feel the pulse" of the district, and to pass along information to the community. For example, health and sanitation issues have been raised with the forum participants. In one meeting in District #5, a recent discussion focused on why people get diarrhea in the summer time. This exploration led to changes in the way people discard their waste. In District #7, the NGOs and other UN agencies use the forums to solicit feedback from the community or to consult on what relief supplies are needed and by whom.

One indicator of the broader acceptance of these forums is the resistance expressed by local citizens, including the commander, when the District #5 Forum decided to move its location. In the same vein, the *mullah* (and member of the elder *shura*) that initially resisted the idea of a women's forum, not only changed his mind and called the initial meeting, but later enrolled his daughter.

Box 7
The Community Forum Health Clinic

The health clinic at District 5 Community Forum has a doctor and an attendant. The doctor can charge less for her services because the forum pays the overheads. Between 10 and 30 patients come in a three hour period. In the winter their complaints are respiratory, in the summer more gastrointestinal. At the moment, the programme is largely curative but in the future, the forum would like to move into more preventative programming including inoculations. In District #5 the reported incidence of diarrhea went down last year. In part this may result from discussions at the forum and *kalantar* level about waste water practices. The local commander played a "strong arm" role in encouraging local residents to dig their own soakage pits rather than allowing the waste water to soak into the irrigation canal.

Consistent with AURP, the forum philosophy is to avoid setting up parallel services to government. Thus, with the daycare and literacy programmes, the teachers are employees of the Department of Labour and Social Affairs and Department of Education respectively. Both these Departments are drastically under funded and are no longer able to provide the type of programming people were accustomed to. Thus the forum provides an alternative model of programme delivery.

The Forum is a remarkable result for AURP. Its outcomes and impacts could be far-reaching: a combined production, service, and education/training centre for women whose profits could eventually also fund additional community services, both social and physical; a practical training for women leaders being developed; and an opportunity for those who are looking to find a place to practice and share their skills (the management teams already have such persons as women members of the engineering departments and university faculty). It serves as a rare model (along with the *karachi* system) of a self-financing community initiative (especially one run entirely by women), and as a vehicle for fostering a collaborative spirit among different sections of Afghan society through their womenfolk (one Forum decided to take turns in meeting in the mosques of the Sunni and Shia Afghanis).

Two issues need further consideration here. First, to what extent will the benefits of the Forum be captured by the somewhat better-off, middle-class, albeit internally displaced, members of the community? The management team and several of those present during our visits did not appear to be members of the poorer sections of the community. On the other hand, those visited in their homes, producing carpets on a piece-work basis, for the Forum did appear representative of the poorer groups. Was the Forum providing them with work opportunities or profiting from being able to pay them very little for

their work? (Afs. 55,000/ month / *geleem* according to one piece-worker visited).

Second, is the Forum truly financially sustainable? The accounts provided by AURP Mazar suggests it is. However, it remains remarkable that in six months an operation like this can become self-financing, living off the payments of what otherwise appears to be an impoverished economic community. Perhaps it is the middle-class women supporting it by purchasing its services. Some of the products for sale - leather handbags etc. - did not appear as mass purchase items in the local community, and their quality was too low (as acknowledged) for the tourist community. Records of the retail outlet visited suggested a sluggish sales performance.

Neither of the above necessarily suggest that the Forums should not proceed: only that they should proceed in parallel with some discussion and examination of the issues raised.

The Hand pump Programme - Case Example
The hand pump programme is another significant result of AURP's activities affecting the neighbourhood. Hand pumps on wells often offer the only source of clean water in a situation where urban water services were inadequate even before war devastation. The AURP through an R & D and production contract with a private Afghan firm in Islamabad, ArianTech, has produced its own versions of the hand pump (see photos in Annex I). There are four basic types: two ordinary pumps and two pressure pumps one each for deep and shallow wells. After initial production in Islamabad the pumps have begun to be produced locally in a few small workshops in Kabul and in Mazar (this apparently is in contrast to the more expensive, UNICEF Mark II imported from India). It is also easily installed and maintained. Special tools have been developed for maintenance, and some training given.

Over a thousand such hand pumps have been produced and installed in Kabul and Mazar and more are planned for these places and for Herat. Every hand pump we visited was being used to the full. The hand pumps have even spurred a market of private water vendors - filling up at the pump and selling the water door to door. Other UN agencies have expressed an interest in purchasing and installing AURP's hand pumps. There is little doubt that the outcome of the hand pump already is many fewer deaths by water-borne diseases and a healthier population, especially among children. A cheaper, less durable hand pump for household use is already produced by small workshops in Afghan cities. However, the better quality version could be marketed to public departments wishing to install public pumps and to other UN agencies, further spurring the economic development of

small workshops and their income and job impacts in the urban economy.

R & D and production of the hand pump in the Islamabad workshop has also provided the opportunity to begin development of other potentially useful, small-scale community technologies. Notable is ASLET (Afghan Suction Latrine Emptying Technology) a suction-pump barrel to empty latrines and manually transport the waste: potentially a latrine version of the *Karachi* system (see photo in Annex I). This too could be manufactured in local workshops, and if successful could in its own right spur similar beneficial health and economic impacts as the hand pump.

There is some concern regarding the maintenance of the hand pump. As may be expected with the introduction of affordable improvements to small-scale technology, there have been reports of breakdowns of hand pumps, particularly in Kabul. Out of 325 pumps installed during 1995/96, there have been 231 repairs recorded of varying severity. A chart of breakdowns given to the evaluators by the Kabul office's water and sanitation staff indicated that some of the more expensive parts imported from Pakistan most frequently needed replacement. Kabul staff suggested, however, that it might be better to have a more expensive pump so long as that assured greater durability. Information on the frequency of repairs on hand pumps of a similar quality (such as the India Mark 2 supplied by UNICEF) was not available during the time of the mission, for the purpose of comparison.

Programme staff are well aware of the need to minimize breakdowns at a crucial stage of the introduction of the improved hand pumps, not least for reasons of credibility. They have therefore worked with both production and installation teams to identify the perceived shortcomings of the process. From this, it emerges that problems have arisen with design or manufacturing defects, materials of a mixed quality, improper installation, misuse or direct war-related damage. In response to these issues, the following remedial steps have been taken, since the start of the process of production and installation:

- minor mechanical improvements to the Arian shallow well pumps (September 1995);
- sources of improved materials have been sought to address evident failures due to the quality of available steel and brass components (May 1995);
- quality control at the production stage has been strengthened (September 1994);
- continuous on-the-job training for installation teams (March 1994); and
- awareness-raising about proper use of hand pumps (June 1995).

Given that the hand pump programme is a major and expanding part of the overall Programme, the frequency of breakdown and repair is clearly an issue that needs to be urgently addressed. The hand pump programme should be carefully monitored to assess whether the remedial steps taken to date have brought the frequency of breakdowns down to an acceptable level. If not, the Programme will need to investigate the main causes of these breakdowns more thoroughly, and more effectively identify and implement measures that would address these causes.

The Day after a Downpour in Kabul - Case Example
This neighbourhood sits on a hill not far from the centre of Kabul. The houses are made of mud brick; the slopes are steep. There are 2,500 families in 1,600 homes in the gozar. The community is transient. People have moved in to get away from the shelling in other parts of the city. Some are renting, others are squatting. Heavy rains had fallen the day before and had caused flash flooding. We were shown a drainage canal that had filled up with mud and debris as a result of the flooding. The 250 meter drainage canal had been constructed by 50 people, had taken one month to complete and involved UNCHS's input of food for work (WFP), stone and cement. It was the pride of the community.

The *Wakil e Gozar* met us and showed us the damage. At first he said, "we are a very poor community, we can not do this kind of work without UNCHS". Then he said that if UNCHS could not help then he would go to the District Office for help. The AURP field worker encouraged him to follow that plan. This is apparently new. Before the Programme, the *Wakil e Gozar* would not likely have approached the District office for help. When asked what they would do if the Sanitation Department did not come, he replied, "if UNCHS or the Sanitation Department can't help, the neighbourhood will have to do the work themselves". They would need tools however. When asked where he would get these he replied, "the Sanitation Department". This linking of different institutions in addressing neighbourhood problems represents another important result and achievement of AURP.

VI. THE WAY AHEAD

A. Key Findings and Recommendations

The findings and recommendations are organized for the overall Programme, the Municipal Programme and the Neighbourhood Programme

1. Overall Programme

Finding I. The AURP programme has been highly successful, to date, in achieving its objectives. These have been defined developmentally as "facilitating and supporting the indigenous process of repair and recovery in the urban areas of Afghanistan" and specifically in terms of neighbourhood action, municipal repair, solid waste disposal, and municipal strengthening. The success of the program in developmental terms is evident in its facilitative and supportive method of working closely with local people, representative organization, and municipal and public utility institutions to achieve repair and recovery.

This repair and recovery is evident, not only in the many physical projects such as in neighbourhood drainage and access improvements, municipal and neighbourhood water supply, and flood protection embankments (73 projects with a total value of $1,925,537 to the end of June 1996). It is also evident in the quality, innovative nature, and social impact of the projects and the processes followed. For example, a mapping system of very high quality and utility has been developed and is widely used; through a systematic R & D process an inexpensive hand pump has been developed and also widely installed while other such community technologies are being developed; an innovative community-financed waste disposal system (*karachi* system) has been created that has wide applications, and community forums led by women are being established as centres for the physical, economic, and social development of neighbourhoods.

No Recommendation

Finding II. AURP is comprised of teams highly committed and competent staff. This is evident in their handwork, in their output, the quality of this output and in their ability to pull together to achieve common objectives. They are also capable of being innovative and flexible, of being reflective in action, of careful planning, and thorough supervision of implementation. This was evident in what we observed of their work in general. This was further underscored by the

enthusiasm with which Programme staff engaged in the collaborative evaluation and planning workshops and the quality of their many insights in these workshops. They are well-led by the international staff and their senior Afghan counterparts. The staff deserve special credit given the difficult conditions in which they work and their modest material rewards.

No Recommendation

Finding III. The Programme has further and better articulated the Programme concept, operational framework, and working method, taking it beyond that which was laid out in the 1994 Programme Document. This conceptualization and framework links the physical/ technical to the social/ institutional at the municipal and neighbourhood levels using a collaborative working method that engages and mobilizes the people and their organizations: from local residents to their neighbourhood representatives up to technical departments and municipal officials.

No Recommendation

Finding IV. To date, AURP has independently implemented its own activities given that it has strong in-house technical capacity *vis a vis* engineers, etc. In the process it has involved local government, specifically municipal, district and neighbourhood councils and their technical departments, personnel (technocrats, engineers, workers) and equipment (trucks, machinery, etc.).

Programme activities have yet to involve other sectors of Afghan society - notably the for-profit sector - to the same extent. The original Programme Document suggested some involvement of the private market, for-profit sector through sub-contracting out programme activities to private contractors. This has been started; the Programme has stimulated the growth of small production workshops for hand pumps, carpets, *geleems*, clothing, etc. As yet, however, there has been no involvement with the Afghan NGO sector which AURP generally considers to be largely profit oriented and unreliable. The Programme has, instead, chosen to promote the growth of "civil society" organizations through such activities as the Community Forums and through attempts to make the zonal and neighbourhood organizations elected and therefore more genuinely community based. These activities are at an early stage of development and show promising potential.

In the future, AURP could consider moving beyond municipal organizations to expand its partnership base more purposefully toward both the for-profit and non-profit sectors of Afghan society. It could, as a start, examine the possibilities for doing this: for example, developing zonal and neighbourhood shuras, and the community forums as non-profit organizations strong enough to eventually take over responsibilities for more basic urban services. There is an example of this scenario already in place in Mazar - the neighbourhood-financed *karachi* waste disposal system (see "A User Pay System of Garbage Collection - Case Example" in Section V.D.1).

In addition, AURP could re-examine the NGO sector to see if there are Afghan organizations more akin to the generally accepted definition of an NGO that the Programme could usefully work with. Given AURP's wide range of activities and finite time frame, it may be that its different activities require partnering and eventual take-over by this as well as the other sectors of Afghan society (i.e. government, private for-profit, and non-profit). This expansion of AURP's partnership base may make it more likely that AURP will find the appropriate partners for its variety of different rehabilitation activities.

Recommendation #1: AURP should actively examine whether, and if so how, it can expand its partnership base beyond municipal government to include the for-profit and non-profit sectors. Some of AURP's rehabilitation activities may more appropriately and effectively be undertaken by these sectors rather than the municipal government sector.

Specific Recommendation: As part of the above, AURP should consider intensifying its efforts in such areas as: supporting district, zonal, and neighbourhood organizations to become more representative of their constituents' rehabilitation needs (e.g. through training programmes for local leaders in resource mobilization and project development, management, and maintenance); income and job-generation activities such as hand pump and building materials production to be run by either Afghan NGOs/CBOs or by private, for-profit organizations with some community benefit assured through say, taxation, or sale price guidelines.

Finding V. The quality and success of the programme has attracted significant collaboration, including cash contributions, from other international organizations - U.N. agencies, other donor agencies, and international NGOs. For example, donor countries such as Australia, the U.K. and most recently, the Netherlands have contributed large amounts on a cost-sharing basis. In addition, the World Food

Programme provides food for several projects, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has also contributed cash, the United Nations Children's Fund provides medicines for the clinics in the Community Forums, and Oxfam UKI has seconded a water engineer to lead AURP's Kabul Water Management Team.

In dollar terms, in addition to the original UNDP core budget of $4,918,025 that initiated the programme in January 1995, the AURP has attracted to date a total of $2,696,064. This sum includes monies obtained directly and contributed to the core budget, and monies attracted indirectly through, for example, AURP implementing projects for other UN agencies and NGOs. Altogether, additional funds amount to 55% of the original UNDP core budget. If we consider only that proportion of these additions that has been directly contributed to the core budget in cost-sharing (Australia, the U.K. and Netherlands), the amount is $877,567 or 18% of the initial UNDP core budget (Table 4-1 revised allocation column does not include the Netherlands contribution which has yet to be released).

No Recommendation

Finding VI. While a large number of projects are on-going or completed (Table 4 - 1), in dollar terms these may amount to less than might be expected at this stage of the Programme (over half way through). Approximately 37% of the total revised core budget has reached the obligated authorized expenditure stage (that is authorized for expenditure by UNCHS Nairobi - Table 4-1). Only 25% of the sub-contract budget has reached this stage with the Neighbourhood contracts portion being only 21%. Eighteen projects are currently under preparation but are likely to take several months to be processed and to begin implementation. Furthermore, the substantial Netherlands contribution (noted in IV above) has not been included in the allocations to be drawn against, since it has yet to be released. This suggests that the Programme will be under pressure to enter a more intensive stage of project preparation, approvals, and implementation in its last 12 months.

Recommendation. (See Recommendation #2, 3 below)

Finding VII. The relatively low rate of sub-contract expenditures can be explained, in part, on the large numbers of projects implemented whose funding are additional to the core budget (as noted in IV above) and, in part, on the slowness with which project documents are prepared and approved. The capacity of the Programme

to develop and have approved, projects will need to be strengthened. Currently 18 projects have been identified and endorsed by the RSC and are in the project document preparation stage, and six projects await the MOA or the release of funds from the UNDP (table 4 - 3).

While no projects currently await payment authorization from UNCHS (Nairobi), analysis of past performance suggests that the length of time this takes is a major cause of project delay. Typically it takes between 31 and 44 workdays between the issuance of the request to UNCHS (Nairobi) and the receipt of the authorization from UNCHS at UNDP. The several other steps in the approvals process from Local Contracts Committee (LCC) approval to UNDPs signing of the MOA take from between 2 to 11 workdays or a total of 32 workdays (Table 4-3).

Recommendation #2: Streamline the payment authorization process of UNCHS Nairobi so that the time it takes to authorize payments can be reduced.

Recommendation #3: Strengthen the ability of regional programme staff to prepare programme documents suitable for presentation to the LCC. This is especially the case for current Kabul staff that currently have no international staff person and have also lost some of their senior Afghan staff. Currently the Programme Support Manager in the PSO in Islamabad prepares project documents for Kabul whereas this should be the responsibility of regional staff (with perhaps a supervisory, `final document check' function in the PSO).

Specific Recommendation: Mount a programme of training for this purpose, perhaps using the preparation of the current 12 Kabul project documents as the basis for the training.

Finding VIII. A basic indicator of success is the number of beneficiaries reached by the Programme and a cost/ beneficiary. The Programme however appears to have no common, transparent way to assess the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries. Consequently it is difficult to assess the reliability of beneficiary counts and their comparability between regions and in comparison with other similar programmes.

Recommendation #4: Establish a reliable, simple, transparent, and commonly agreed upon method to count beneficiaries for each of the project types. Using this method, review existing projects to identify the number of beneficiaries and costs/beneficiary.

Finding IX. Another basic indicator of success is the number of especially needy beneficiaries that the Programme has reached. Persons such as the very poor, the disabled, war widows and women-headed households fall into this category. There is some evidence to suggest that at least some, and perhaps a significant amount of the Programme benefits could be going to the less poor or even the middle and upper middle-class of people.

Recommendation #5: Establish a simple, transparent and reliable way of tracking the type of beneficiaries, or at least whether the neediest in the community are benefiting by the Programme.

Finding X. Currently the Programme works without an overall explicit planning and decision-making framework and process that links together the National Programme Manager, the PSO, and RPOs. Regional programme staff work relatively autonomously of the Programme Manager, the PSO, and of each other. Contacts between these groups tend to be of a procedural, reporting, and logistical support nature. There are no mechanisms through which to jointly and explicitly agree on, and perhaps more important, periodically review, the common set of objectives, policies, and strategies that would give the Programme a coherent, if appropriately evolving common identity.

While a decentralized approach is appropriate for the Programme given its regional nature, the lack of a common planning and decision-making framework within which to implement this approach has resulted in some negative effects. Examples are: the evolving concept, operational framework, and working method, is unevenly understood and accepted and differently interpreted, in the different regions; the programme is not abreast nationally and within each region on such matters as budgets and expenditures and whether they are over or underspending; the relative roles and responsibilities of the RPOs and the PSO is unclear to the staff in each of these offices; regional staff feel they are not adequately informed of and involved in the larger policy and decision-making processes of the programme; regional staff feel cut-off from each other and feel the lack of a common, shared identity; opportunities to learn from each other's experiences, strengths and weaknesses are not facilitated; differences and misunderstandings between RPOs and between RPO and PSO can arise and not be addressed till they are more serious than they would otherwise have become.

These and other reasons were expressed by staff in each of the regional collaborative evaluation and planning workshops. Also apparent was

both a strong desire and capacity to participate in a process of national programme level planning. The National Programme Manager has proposed and just initiated the establishment of a Programme Management Team for this purpose. It consists of the National Programme Manager, the Programme Support Manager, the international Regional Programme Managers and the senior Afghan counterparts from each RPO. Meetings will be open to other members of the Programme unless confidential matters are to be discussed. The first meeting of the Programme Management Team (PMT) is to be the 4th of May 1996.

Recommendation #6: Establish and support the PMT and its need to meet on a regular basis. Establish the mandate and functions of the PMT, its roles and responsibilities, and its methods for decision-making, relative to the overall Programme and relative to each regional programme.

Specific Recommendation: The PMT should agree on a set of broad objectives, and policy, programme and strategy guidelines within which the PSO and RPOs operate.

Specific Recommendation: The PMT should devise a broad indicative planning, monitoring and evaluation framework within which the Programme will plan, implement, and periodically assess its overall activities.

Specific Recommendation: The PMT should agree upon the specific and relative roles, responsibilities and mutual expectations of the Programme Manager, the PSO and the RPOs.

Finding XI. Each RPO develops its activities without an explicit overall plan for its region of activities and without explicit reference to the national programme. It also does so without being given clear budgetary parameters related to a given period of time nor adequate knowledge of how its activities and expenditures are drawing down on any implicit budgetary allocations it may have. Consequently, for example, a particular region may suddenly be informed that it has overspent its allocation when it believed it had not done so (this was reported in two of the three regions). The extent to which each RPO also has a core planning group and a planning framework, to anticipate, guide, and interrelate programme activities varies with region. The extent to which each RPO has a regular meeting schedule in which to agree on regional objectives and strategies, and to plan, programme, exchange information and ideas, and anticipate and address concerns also varies with region. While an implicit common

purpose and the collaborative nature of the work has helped build a team spirit within each RPO, this spirit and the general effectiveness of the programme would be enhanced by having a more explicit process for overall planning and by developing an indicative planning framework.

Recommendation #7: The PMT should establish parameters for regional office planning which sets out for each RPO:

1. broad objectives, and policy, programme and strategy guidelines consistent with both regional conditions and those of the national programme;
2. a broad indicative planning, monitoring and evaluation framework within which the regional programme can plan, implement, and periodically assess its overall activities; and
3. some annual budgetary guidelines to help each regional office match anticipated activity with available resources.

Finding XII. As it stands, the original Programme document does not adequately reflect the overall Programme concept in terms of its physical and social dimensions as currently implemented by the Programme. While the development objective, immediate objectives and strategies are generally well reflected in practice, the outputs and indicators of success fall far short. With their emphasis on financial flows and numbers of subcontracts let in the field, these micro aspects of the Programme Document fail to capture the qualitative, capacity building achievements of AURP which, after all, seem more germane to the development objective. The Programme would be well served, if the outputs and indicators were updated to correct this situation.

The Evaluators have developed an evaluation matrix (see Appendix III) which might assist those conducting this exercise. It contains more than 90 indicator statements, each matched to topics related to: mandate, method and implementation. Many, if not most, of these indicator statements capture the qualitative spirit of the AURP. In addition, staff from the RPOs and the PSO have identified additional indicators and outputs through collaborative workshops held during this evaluation. These are documented in Appendix IV.

One caution; there is always a danger, we feel, in becoming too detailed with "micro-measures" like outputs and indicators. They should only be used in an indicative manner - as a reference point. Situations change over time and from place to place. Programme managers and their sponsors need to flex with these changing situations and thus cannot be tied too rigidly to a set of anticipated outputs and indicators.

Recommendation #8: As a first step the UNDP should review and update the Programme document in light of AURP's current conditions, concepts and practices. It should give the Programme's senior professional staff (notably the newly formed Programme Management Team) a central role in this process as they are best informed of the Programme. Should UNDP wish to obtain outside consultants for this exercise, we would recommend they be hired as advisors to the PMT.

Recommendation #9: That those mandated to design any future phase of AURP build on the work carried out in the recommendation immediately above ensuring that the design document adequately reflects both the qualitative (social) and quantitative (physical) dimensions of the Programme.

Finding XIII. The Programme benefits disproportionately less from the insights, resources, and efforts of women in the community and its activities do not adequately reach out to nor address the concerns of women in the community. This is significant given that women and children (e.g. war widows and women-headed households) constitute a large proportion of those needing assistance, and that there are capable women in the community such as women professionals who could be employed in the Programme. There are social constraints to men staff reaching out to involve women and to designing and implementing programmes that would involve the participation of women. Currently there are only four women out of the forty professional staff persons in the Programme.

Recommendation #10: Actively recruit more women in professional staff positions in the programme. Actively promote projects that reflect the concerns and tap the resources of women.

Finding XIV. Given the twin linked physical/ technical and social/ institutional objectives of the Programme and its working method of closely collaborating with and helping mobilize the community and municipal organizations, the Programme has disproportionately fewer staff with a social, community development and financial analysis preparation dedicated to this aspect of the Programme (five out of forty professional staff).

Recommendation #11: Actively recruit more staff with a community development and financial preparation.

Finding XV. Several other staffing issues demand attention (See Section IV.B.3 & 4). These include a lengthy, cumbersome procedure for hiring staff, inappropriately detailed procedures (such as the requirement to advertise) for hiring even staff such as drivers and caretakers, job descriptions that do not reflect actual work done, salary scales that do not reflect responsibilities held, a salary payment procedure for Afghan staff that reportedly erodes the purchasing power of the salaries with inflation in the local currency, and a large disparity between international and Afghan staff in salary and status, which is disproportionate with competence.

Recommendation #12: Streamline and simplify the hiring process, especially for lower echelon staff; bring job descriptions and salary scales in line with jobs being done and responsibilities held; review the salary payment procedure for Afghan staff and, if need be, establish a way to stabilize the purchasing power of salaries against the volatile Afghan currency; and examine ways in which some of the disparities between the international and the Afghan staff can be mitigated and/or compensated for.

Finding XVI. The creditable performance of the AURP and the continuing needs of Afghanistan for rehabilitation suggest that the Programme should be extended beyond March 1997, perhaps with some reformulation. The nature of the work required, needing time for development and impact, suggests that the extended or reformulated programme should not be of too short a duration. Both UNDP and UNCHS appear to be supportive of this possibility.

Recommendation #13: Extend the Programme beyond March 1997 for a minimum period of three years. Let the Programme staff and specifically the PMT lead the process of formulating the extended or new Programme, perhaps aided by facilitators, resource persons or advisors. Begin the process of designing the extended Programme within the next month or so to ensure that all that is necessary is in place by the start of the Programme in March 1997.

2. *The Municipal Level*

Finding XVII. This level of the Programme's activities relies heavily on engaging municipal officials and personnel of technical departments. The conditions of government work and salary scale of these persons are so low that many such persons have to expend much time and energy to obtain alternative sources of income to make ends meet. Most often, these activities are for the private market on projects

that are for private benefit. Consequently, it is often difficult to obtain the collaboration of such persons in AURP projects geared to public benefit without an adequate incentive system. This incentive may not need to be substantial since the opportunity cost of the services of such persons in the current highly depressed labour market is relatively low. Given that these persons can be quite highly trained, and that incentives need be quite modest, the lack of an incentive structure for engaging such persons is a loss of such expertise potentially obtained at "bargain rates" in service of the public good.

Incentive systems used in other international projects range from honorariums paid for time spent on these projects (Philippines - World Bank), to food supplements given through the World Food Programme/Food for Work (Sambizanga Project, Angola - multilateral funding), to participation in training workshops, seminars, meetings and observation visits to other programmes, municipalities etc. in local, national and international venues (common in many UN and World Bank programmes.

Recommendation #14: Identify an adequate and appropriate incentive system to more fully engage the collaboration of municipal personnel and personnel in technical departments in projects that would help promote the public good.

Finding XVIII. The very constrained resources of the municipality along with war damage, severely limits the capacity of the municipality to deliver urban services such as water, sanitation and waste disposal. Municipal personnel in technical and administrative departments, as mentioned above, cannot afford to spend their time wholly or even largely on official municipal activities. Both these conditions offer a window of opportunity to innovate. The lack of a strong municipal government with rigid, enforceable rules on how municipal services must be delivered gives AURP the room and flexibility to develop and demonstrate innovative and cost-effective ways to deliver these services.

The severely constrained resources of the municipality make them more receptive to suggestions of modifying service-delivery and methods to make them more efficient. For example, the AURP is considering developing more cost and time-efficient ways of waste disposal. This might involve placing the waste in a trailer-type vehicle at residential waste collection points rather than on the ground. These trailers can then be hitched to a tractor for hauling the waste away without the need to shovel the waste up again from the ground in to a truck for hauling.

Recommendation #15: AURP should actively innovate to develop more cost, time-efficient and targeted ways of delivering municipal services. These experiments should be carefully recorded and demonstrated to both the residents and the municipal officials and their relevant technical departments.

Finding XIX. Municipal resources and services such as land and water are limited. What there is, is under priced or not priced at all. The presence of water vendors, observed for example in Mazar, suggests that there is a market in water as well. The Herat water department proposed to us a scheme for selling water that could recoup an initial investment in fuel (requested of the Programme) in the first few months and would be self-financing from thereon. There is also some evidence to suggest that municipal land for example is distributed or sold for much below what it would sell even in current conditions of war and instability. This results in an erosion of the municipal resource base and in low revenues. The original AURP Programme Document anticipates an urban land policy study which has as yet to be initiated.

Recommendation #16: Examine the potential revenue-generating resources of the municipality, the market for these resources such as the land and water markets, and the potential for developing and delivering these services in a manner that is affordable to both the consumer and the provider of the service, such as the municipality. Do this with the municipality to obtain accurate information and train personnel in the design and implementation of such revenue-generating systems. On a gradual, pilot-project basis begin introducing user-fees, tariff and tax increases applied in a progressive (willingness and ability to pay) basis.

Finding XX. In both Herat and Mazar it appeared that rapid population growth was being accommodated through the physical expansion of areas on the periphery of the cities while more central areas were not fully settled. These beginnings of urban sprawl, which can result in an urban form that is inefficient, inequitable, and costly to service, may be being inadvertently exacerbated by AURP projects which provide services to those areas. An example is the graveling of primary access roads that are located at the edges of the city connecting to such areas.

Recommendation #17: The patterns and trends of urban development of the three cities and their implications for a more compact, efficient

and equitable city should be studied, especially with regard to the impact that the AURP projects are having on these.

Finding XXI. Municipal and public utility institutions and their personnel must become more sympathetic to and knowledgeable about issues such as the above, if they are not already so. This requires that such institutions and personnel participate in the examination of such issues. It also requires some training in related skills of designing, implementing and managing such systems and municipalities. With the assistance of AURP, the municipality in Mazar, for example, established a high level commission for the coordination of activities in the city. This suggests some interest in more purposeful municipal level planning. The training budget of AURP is highly underutilized: less than 11% of the amount allocated has reached the stage of receiving obligated authorized expenditure (Table 4 - 1).

Recommendation #18: Run short training courses on municipal planning including low-cost, efficient and equitable ways to deliver municipal services and generate municipal revenues. Train municipal personnel in these topics. The offer of such training can also serve as part of a work-incentive package for engaging municipal and utilities personnel. Inviting personnel from different cities to the same training course in one of the city locations might also contribute to some breaking down of the barriers constructed by divided political factions. Gradually, if not at first, more senior members of the municipality up to the Mayor might be invited to come together to learn and exchange views on planning their cities. This might help build bridges of understanding at higher levels between these different regions or at least their cities.

3. *The Neighbourhood Level*

Finding XXII. Much neighbourhood activity by the AURP is done through district and neighbourhood representatives - *Raeeseh Naheeyehs* and *Wakil or Kalantar e Guzars*. There is some evidence to suggest that some of these persons are not fully representative of their communities. Some are government appointments that have kept their positions for decades. AURP has measures to foster more representative structures such as the Zonal *Shuras* (a sub-district comprising several *Guzars*) as a sub-district development council and the Community Forums.

Recommendation #19: Actively pursue the testing of the representativeness of the official neighbourhood and district heads by

also speaking directly with the people. Actively pursue fostering parallel representative groups such as the Zonal *Shuras* and the Community Forums.

Finding XXIII. The neighbourhood organizations approach to potential projects from AURP may vary from handing over a wish-list of projects to the Programme with little expectation of further involvement, to more careful selection of a preferred project, an in-kind contribution to its implementation, and forethought on how the organization could maintain the project. The latter scenario is less frequent. In particular, projects have been implemented with little organization for their sustainable operations and maintenance.

For example there is no one locally responsible to ensure that the service is not willfully damaged or misused or to repair any damage done (we were told that one of the causes of hand pump damage was that which occurred when children pushed stones up its spout). AURP has to perform this repair and maintenance function with the hope that in the future the municipality will do so. On the other hand, the community financed *karachi* system suggests residents are willing to pay for a service. In the case of water, some residents are already paying for this service to the vendors. Neighbourhood organizations can be created and sustained, in part, by giving them the responsibility for identifying, preparing, helping implement and maintain essential neighbourhood services.

Recommendation #20: Actively attempt to establish street or block or neighbourhood groups entrusted with project development and maintenance. Examine incentives for the creation and maintenance of such groups whose responsibility it could be to identify projects, select among alternative possibilities, mobilize resources, develop the project and maintain it. Incentives such as a small matching grants system might lever local monies. Training in project development and local resource mobilization might be another incentive while strengthening the capacity to do so.

Finding XXIV. With the general success of the AURP, there is pressure for the Programme to expand. Possibilities include expansion to smaller cities and towns in the three regions of Kabul, Mazar and Herat and expansion to new areas such as Qandahar. At the same time, evidence presented above suggests that the Programme will be under pressure to achieve its existing mandate before the end of its term in March 1997.

Recommendation #21: The PMT should examine and make a recommendation on expansion. Before recommending significant expansion, it should seriously consider the need to ensure a consolidation of the existing Programme along the lines of improvements suggested in the recommendations outlined above. The capacity of the Programme to efficiently and effectively manage itself and benefit its constituents should be more fully secured before such expansion is embarked upon. Any expansion should be undertaken with additional and adequate resources, financial, human, and physical and not through the rearrangement of existing resources.

Appendix I: Terms of Reference

Joint Evaluation Mission
of the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and UNCHS
of
AFG/93/002 - Urban Rehabilitation Programme

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Background

By all indicators, Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed countries of the world which has suffered from a continuing internal conflict and destruction for the last 16 years. A large segment of the population fled the country as refugees (approximately 5-6 million) mainly to Pakistan and Iran. Since 1992, a large number of those refugees have returned but more than one half still remain outside the country. The escalating conflict, targeted at the capital city of Kabul has displaced another large part of the population, almost 1.5 million, within the country.

Afghanistan is traditionally a rural country and these rural areas have been hard-hit by the conflict. The urban centres have therefore attracted a large number of internally displaced persons although the cities have not been spared from the scourges of war. Not only the houses of the residents but also the municipal infrastructure have been severely damaged. As a result of the conflict, the capacity of the local and central technical departments has been handicapped and they cannot cope on their own with the huge challenges.

UNCHS (Habitat) has since January 1995 been responsible for the execution of an Urban Rehabilitation Programme in Afghanistan, AFG/93/002. This is a successor project to the Housing for Resettlement project (AFG/90/008) which was also executed by UNCHS. AFG/93/002 has an approved budget of US$ 4,918,025 and an additional US$ 2,000,000 is available through trust funds and parallel financing.

The objective of the current programme is to support the indigenous process of recovery of urban communities. Working from Municipal Support Offices in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, the programme has supported a wide range of rehabilitation activities. This has included small-scale living conditions improvements undertaken with community groups (under the Neighbourhood Action Programme) and essential repairs of urban infrastructure (under the Infrastructure Repair Programme) with municipal organizations. In addition to repairs to physical infrastructure, the programme has supported initiatives aimed at strengthening community structures and technical institutions as appropriate.

Programme staff have continually been involved in refining the approach used to address issues that arise from extensive contacts in the field. The UNCHS programme was subject to an internal review in November 1995, which set out to develop the key themes from the ongoing programme and the completed AFG/90/008 Housing for Resettlement. Since then, UNCHS has actively participated in the formulation of an inter-agency Operational Strategy. This will form part of a joint process with UNDP to develop a Country Programme Review by mid-1996, with a view to setting strategic goals for the biennium 1997/98. It is intended that the evaluation of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme will contribute to the formulation of the proposed Review.

2. Purpose of the evaluation

Focusing on the last 14 months of the programme operation, the main purpose of the evaluation is to:

- determine the effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and impact of the programme;
- assess whether the management structure and other aspects of project design adequately support the activities carried out under the programme;
- highlight key issues related to the implementation and make specific recommendations for action to be taken;
- review the process adopted for rehabilitation activities in the field (from resource-identification to project completion) and make specific recommendations for possible changes in or refinement of the operating methodology;
- assess the impact of co-operation in the field with other UN agencies and with public sector institutions;
- make recommendations, based on the above, as to which changes could be adopted in the identification process, design and implementation of the activities carried out under the project.

3. Issues to be covered

In response to purpose of the evaluation, the assessment and documentation of the activities undertaken under AFG/93/002 by the evaluation mission should be based upon equal consideration of activities carried out in three urban centres, and should include:

a. Documentation of actual outputs against the projections made in the project document. This should include activities undertaken under the programme with support from external resources or contributions in kind.

b. Detailed assessment of the past and future role of partner organizations in the implementation of urban rehabilitation, including technical institutions, community groups, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations.

c. The role of the programme as a catalyst for urban recovery activities amongst and within partner organizations, from urban communities to external agencies.

d. An assessment of the role played by programme staff and partner organizations in existing co-ordination mechanisms, with recommendations for possible changes in the nature of the participation in such mechanisms.

e. An assessment of the interaction with local communities in the identification and the implementation phase of programme activities, with particular attention to measures for ensuring the participation of a broad section of these communities (including women) and the mechanisms used for selection.

f. Recommendation, on the basis of documentation being developed by UNCHS, on the viability of alternative success criteria for programme activities, which will seek to incorporate a qualititative analysis of the processes supported by the programme.

g. Identification, in close consultation with programme staff, of key bottlenecks in programme operations and activities, with recommendations for solutions where appropriate.

h. Recommendations, on the basis of the findings above, for possible future support for the rehabilitation of urban settlements in Afghanistan. These recommendations should particularly focus on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the approach, concept and methodology.

4. Composition of the mission

The evaluation is to be carried out by two external experts, who will have an advanced degree in a relevant technical or social field, and experience of the management of rehabilitation programmes or evaluation in the context of complex emergencies. The mission members should have a proven record in the use of appropriate evaluation techniques, and a familiarity with the issues related to post-conflict situations. The persons should be prepared to work in circumstances prone to conflict and to accept the restrictions implicit in working in an Islamic society. Fluency in English is essential, and a familiarity with Dari (Farsi) would be an advantage.

5. Timetable and duration

The evaluation will be of a duration of six weeks and will commence in March 1996. The mission will include at least four weeks of travel and site visits in urban Afghanistan. A detailed timetable will be worked out jointly in consultation with UNDP and programme staff upon arrival.

6. Reporting

The mission members will maintain close liaison with the UNDP Resident Representative, his designated staff, representatives of other agencies and programme staff. While the mission members should be at liberty to discuss with staff of technical institutions or other agencies any issue related to their assignment, they are not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNDP or UNCHS.

The mission members will submit a draft evaluation report to the Coordinator, UNCHS, Unit III. Submission of a draft report to the Resident Representative, UNDP Afghanistan, and to the AFG/93/002 Programme Manager is required in advance of final in-country debriefing and departure. Formal comments should be solicited from those offices in advance of departure. The evaluators are responsible for reflecting any correction of facts on the draft report in the final version and for seeing that at least 10 copies are submitted to UNDP, through UNCHS, for formal distribution.

Appendix II: Itinerary, List of People Interviewed and List of Documents Reviewed

Itinerary

March 29th	Document Review. Leave Canada
March 30 - April 1	Arrive **Nairobi.** Meetings with UN HABITAT staff connected to Afghanistan Programme. Continue to Islamabad.
April 2	Arrive **Islamabad**. Briefing with UNCHS and UNDP (Afghanistan) offices. Prepare for onward travel to Afghanistan.
April 3 - 7	Arrive **Herat.** Briefing with Herat Regional Programme Office staff. City tour. Individual staff interviews. Site visits including meetings with neighbourhood elders, and conversations with district representatives, site engineers and citizens-at-large. Interviews with Mayor and municipal leaders, heads and engineers with the Departments of Construction, Sanitation and Water Supply. Interviews with staff of WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNOCHA. Half day collaborative evaluation workshop with staff of Regional Programme Office (see description of collaborative evaluation workshop in Section II.A.5). Return to Islamabad.
April 8-10	**Islamabad.** Develop Evaluation Matrix (see Section II.A.4, and Appendix IV). Half day collaborative workshop with Senior Programme Staff (including: Programme Manager, Deputy Programme Manager (Herat), Assistant Programme Manager (Mazar) and Programme Support Officer).
April 11-16	Arrive **Mazar**. Briefing with Mazar Regional Programme Office staff. City tour. Individual staff interviews. Site visits including conversations with district representatives, community forum leaders, site engineers project workers and citizens-at-large. Interviews with distict leaders, heads and engineers with the Departments of Construction, Sanitation and Water Supply. Interviews with staff of UNICEF, UNHCR and UNOCHA. Half day collaborative evaluation workshop with staff of Regional Programme Office. Leave for Islamabad.
April 16-17	**Islamabad.** Write up Mazar observations. Prepare for travel to Kabul.
April 18-22	Arrive in **Kabul.** Briefing with Kabul Regional Programme Office staff, set schedule for site visits and interviews. City tour. Individual staff interviews. Site visits including conversations with district, zonal and neighbourhood leaders, site engineers, project workers and citizens-at-large. Interviews with officials from the Municipal Liaison Office, staff of the Water Management Team, a staffperson from the Afghan NGO Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), the Tear Fund and OXFAM UKI. Interviews with staff of UNHCR, UNOCHA UNICEF and WFP. Half day collaborative evaluation workshop with staff of Regional Programme Office. Leave for Islamabad.
April 23 - May 4	**Islamabad.** Interviews with staff of Programme Support Office. Document review. Draft Evaluation Report. Interviews with key personnel of UNDP Afghanistan office. Interviews with senior staff at UNOPS and UNOCHA. Meeting with Eric Dudley, consultant to UNCHS and author of a number of AURP documents. Issue first draft of Report. Final Briefing meeting at UNDP to discuss draft. Final Workshop with Programme staff to discuss draft. Write second draft and submit to UNDP prior to departure.
Post Mission	Receive and Incorporate UNDP and UNCHS comments on draft report. Final analysis and submit document.

List of People Interviewed

Stakholders in the Municipality and Community
In Herat, Mazar and Kabul we interviewed the following actors:
Mayor and/or District Heads
Senior administrators of Water, Sanitation, Roads and Construction Departments
Engineers working for the above mentioned departments
Workers on various water, sanitation, access and flood protection projects
Neighbourhood and zonal representatives
Citizens active in various councils (shuras) and Community Forums
Service providers (doctors, tailors, carpet weavers, teachers) to Community Forums
Men, women and children in the street

UNCHS Staff
Individual interviews and "collaborative evaluation" workshops were held with the staff of the three Regional Programme Offices and the Programme Support Office.

Key staff members interviewed included:

Madhab B. Mathema, Human Settlements Advisor, Technical Cooperation Division
Jolyon Leslie, Human Settlements Advisor, Technical Cooperation Divsion (formerly Programme Manager)
Paul Casalonga, Programme Manager
Eric Cole, Deputy Programme Manager (Herat)
Samantha Reynolds, Assistant Programme Manager (Mazar)
Eng. Salim Qaium, Acting Coordinator, Kabul
Jess Oxidental, Programme Support Officer (Islamabad)
Taj Mohammad Yarmand, Industrial Rehabilitation Consultant (Islamabad)
Dr. A. Sh. Satarzai, Senior Programme Assistant (Islamabad)

Other UN and NGO Personnel
Knut Ostby - Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Afghanistan
Tom Vens - Programme Officer, UNDP Afghanistan
John R. Stewart - Senior Programme Advisor, UNDP Afghanistan
Sultan Hussain - Programme Officer, Rehabilitation Steering Committee Secretariat, UNDP Afghanistan
Magda Ninaber van Eyben - Head of Programme Section, UNOCHA
J. Alex Thier - Field Officer (Kabul), UNOCHA
Anthony Badha, Field Officer (Herat), UNOCHA
Sultan Aziz - Programme Manager, UNOPS
Musa A. Bungudu - Resident Project Officer (Mazar), UNICEF
Jerry_____ - Resident Project Officer (Herat), UNICEF
Ahmed Gubartalla, Head of Sub-Office (Herat), UNHCR
Yousif. A. Adam, Programme Officer (Mazar), UNHCR
Stephanie Akino, Field Officer (Herat - on mission in Kabul), UNHCR
Richard Verbeeck - Project Officer (Herat), WFP

Ismail Omar, Official in Charge (Kabul), WFP
Tony Bird, Team Leader, Tear Fund (under the protocol of IAM), Kabul
Jeff Eames, Water Management Team Leader & Project Manager (Kabul), OXFAM UKI
Engineer Abdul Wasi Arian, Coordinator Engineering Department, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA)
Visiting Rep. of NOVIB (a Norwegian NGO)
Head of International Red Cross Committee, Mazar i Shariff

Other Interviewees
Eric Dudley, Consultant
Dr Yar Ahmad, Manager, Arian Tech Industrial Goods, Design, Manufacture & Supply, Islamabad.

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Appendix III: Evaluation Matrix

The Afghanistan URP Evaluation Matrix (Working Draft)

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
I. URP Mission			
A. Mandate, Development Objectives and Beneficiaries *Is the URP performing to the letter and spirit of its mandate?* *Is the mandate still relevant given the Project context?*	a) Is there a clear mandate guiding the URP? b) Does this mandate include such aspects as: -geographic coverage -sectoral focus -approaches and methods -end states/objectives -guiding principles c) Is this mandate appropriate to the geographic and institutional context of the URP? d) How has the URP's mandate evolved? e) Is there a vision of how the URP's mandate must evolve in the future? f) How does URP's development objective relate to the mandate? g) How is the mandate and development objective used in planning the program?	• Agreement among staff of the Project Support Office (PSO) and Regional Program Offices (RPOs) as to what the mandate is • Shared recognition among staff of the different dimensions of the mandate • Match between the URP mandate and development objective and those of the UNDP and UNCHS • Mandate influenced by such factors as: -other UN agency mandates -changes in staffing -changing political, social, economic dynamics of Afghanistan -shifts in reconstruction & development thinking • Staff articulate a strong vision of how the Program should develop • Development objective embodies key themes set out in the mandate • URP managers structure their programs on the specifications set out in the Program Document	• Program Document • Review documents • Minutes of meetings • Staff of PSO and RPOs • Other UN orgs. and NGOs working in the Country • Observation

Note: This matrix is intended as a rough guide for this mid term evaluation, and a discussion piece for future planning and evaluation work within the Programme.

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Does the URP effectively channel resources to areas most affected by war and experiencing a heavy influx of people? *(overview and sub-level office)*	h) What criteria are used to determine who requires priority assistance from the URP? i) How do URP staff know who are in the greatest need of the Project's assistance? j) Are projects located in areas of greatest need?	• Situation analysis of program settings identifying areas of greatest need • Location of projects in relation to greatest need	• Situation analysis • Program staff & management • Observation
II. Approach/ Method			
A. Strategies, Immediate Objectives and Program Components *Does the URP effectively translate its development objective and mandate into operations?* *(overview and Regional Program level)*	a) What are the URP's strategies, and are they appropriate to the mandate and development objective? b) What are the URP's immediate objectives and are they consistent with the strategies and development objective? c) Are the URP's immediate objectives mutually reinforcing? d) Are the immediate objectives operationalized at the Regional Program level?	• Strategies work with the existing organizations involved in the process of recovery • Immediate objectives specify ways the Program will enhance local organizations and processes for recovery • Objectives pursued jointly achieve more than if pursued separately • Workplans and activities of each program component help achieve the immediate objectives • RPO plans and projects are matched with resources	• Planning documents • Monitoring and evaluation documents • RPO and PSO staff • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Is the mix of projects mutually reinforcing and appropriate to available resources and field conditions? *(Overview and Regional Program levels)*	h) Does the URP's complement of projects have focus by sector, theme or by geography? i) How do each of the following factors shape the portfolio of activities: -immediate objectives and outputs specified in the Program Document? -requests and conditions set by local government? -requests of municipal authorities? -requests of neighbourhood groups? -activities and requests of other development organizations working in the same area? -area/situation analyses of the project area as a whole? -an emergency management perspective -a medium and long term development (sustainability) perspective j) Are the activities consistent with the approach set out in the Program Document?	• Many projects fall under one sector or theme, and/or concentrate in one geographic area • Projects selected from lists presented by neighbourhood groups or municipal authorities • Projects fill gaps in infrastructure and services identified in neighbourhood surveys • Projects help meet the mandates of other development organizations • Project designs reflect a balancing of a) stated project objectives/ outputs, b) stakeholder requests/demands, and c) strategic issues related to long term urban recovery • Projects... -are tailored to local conditions -reinforce one another (i.e. between and within neighbourhoods, between larger scale infrastructure projects, and between the neighbourhood and the larger scale infrastructure projects) -work with and reinforce local government and community structures and processes -focus on areas with relatively high war damage and heavy population density -mobilize public and private sector contractors for project implementation	• Program Document • Situation analysis/ mapping documents • Planning documents • Internal review documents • Reports to Rehabilitation Steering Committee (RSC) • Managers and staff • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
		-are largely implemented by Afghans -enhance the skills of national professionals within the implementing organizations	
III Resourcing and Implementation			
A. Organizational Structure and Staffing *Is the organizational structure appropriate for developing the URP program?*	a) What is the organizational structure of the URP (at Program and Regional Program levels)? b) Does the structure permit effective program implementation?	• Clear lines of authority and responsibility • Appropriate and timely flow of information between and within the offices/programs of the URP • Minimal redundancy of effort • Distances (geographic, cultural, experiential and otherwise) between decision-makers and implementors effectively bridged	• Organigram • Procedures documentation • PSO and RPO staff • UNCHS/UNDP • Observation
Is the URP appropriately staffed and managed to carry out its complement of activities? *(overview and Regional Program level)*	c) Do staff have appropriate qualifications and/or experience? d) How does the performance of staff contribute to the achievement of the URPs immediate objectives? e) How does the URP management optimize the use of staff skills and experience? f) What mechanisms does the URP use to resolve conflict among staff? g) Are staff monitored and evaluated? h) Are staff properly supported and supervised? i) How does management build a team spirit and promote collaboration?	• Staff are responsible for activities for which they have the appropriate abilities, qualifications, experience and motivations • Staff roles are clearly delineated • Staff share the same understanding of the objectives, methods and resources to achieve them • Projects are undertaken by staff in a collaborative manner • Staff roles are complementary • Staff receive on-the-job supervision • Staff participate in program decision making • Staff are consulted on their training needs and receive training?	• Organigram • Job descriptions • CVs • Training plans • URP managers and staff • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
B. Organizational Linkages *Is the Program sensitive to the needs and assets of indigenous organizations & communities?* *To what extent does the Program encourage networking among municipal and neighbourhood organizations?* *To what extent does the program contribute to and make the most of the wider UN, NGO and bilateral donor effort in Afghanistan?* *(overview and Regional Program level)*	a) How receptive, to the URP are people: -in the effected neighbourhoods? -in the effected municipal authorities? -in the various government bodies? b) How does the URP engage with: -neighbourhood groups? -municipal/utility organizations? -government? c) Does the URP/Habitat communicate its Program and projects clearly to potential donors? c) How do URP operations assist other development organizations achieve their objectives, and *visa versa*? d) What formal and informal mechanisms are in place to facilitate cooperation among development organizations?	• Neighbourhood representatives meet willingly with URP staff to discuss issues • Neighbourhood aspirations drive the selection of projects • Meetings with local organizations consistently well attended • Projects require the collaboration of municipal and neighbourhood organizations • URP/Habitat known by UN organizations and other donors for what it does • URP/Habitat programs attract a wide range of donor interest and support • Scheduled meetings requiring the participation of two or more development organizations • Agency personnel share experiences and ideas with each other on a day to day basis	• Local residents • Staff of municipal authorities • Field staff and managers • Staff of UN and other development organizations • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
C. Planning, Management, Monitoring and Evaluation *Are the URP planning procedures and instruments appropriate for guiding project development and implementation?*	a) Does the Program use a set of planning principles, procedures, instruments and techniques which encompass the project cycle, and if is so what are they? b) Does the planning process reflect the values and principles outlined in the Program Document? c) Is the planning process democratic? d) Do planning documents and processes address both quality and quantity, and process and product?	• Planning process includes such planning steps as needs assessment, project identification, preparation and appraisal, monitoring and evaluation • Consistency between overall Program planning, Regional Program planning and planning related to implementation of individual program components • Planning documents and workplans address both the outputs and the process of achieving them	• Planning documents • Management • Field staff • Observation
Are the URP staff systematically deployed according to operational plans? *(Regional Program level)*	e) How are Regional Program plans transformed into workplans at the program component level? f) Are workplans at the program component level monitored? g) Are workplans consistent with agreed budgets, and program and project targets?	• Workplans detailing the inputs necessary to implement Regional Program plans • Quarterly and annual reports that specify progress toward a set of expected outputs • Relationship of annual operating plans to staff or unit level plans • Utility of planning documents as a reference • Use of planning documents as benchmarks in monitoring and evaluation	• Workplans • Quarterly and annual reports • Minutes of staff meetings • URP staff • URP management • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Individual Project Cycle *Does the URP follow a systematic approach to project design, approval, implementation and evaluation?*	Note: the following questions under this heading apply to outputs associated with the Neighbourhood Action Program, Municipal Infrastructure Repair, Solid Waste Disposal, and Municipal Strengthening Objectives.		
Design	a) How does the URP establish a relationship with communities/ municipal authorities? b) By what process are issues discussed and projects identified and designed? Who participates? Who doesn't? c) What interests do neighbourhood groups/ municipal authorities bring into the relationship? d) How do the participating groups (including the URP) agree upon their respective roles and responsibilities? e) Do neighbourhood groups and municipal authorities draw upon the experiences, knowledge and skills of social groups other than their own? f) Does the design of the project reflect shared interest and commitment among stakeholders?	• URP has a tested methodology for engaging neighbourhoods and municipal authorities in projects • High degree of counterpart (neighbourhood group/municipal authority) contribution to the project relative to their capabilities and available resources • Contributions of the URP and neighbourhoods/municipal authorities complement each other	• Residents • Municipal reps. • Mapping information • Project summaries/ descriptions • URP staff • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Approvals	a) Are criteria used to approve projects? if so what are they? b) Are these criteria consistent with the mandate of the URP? b) Is the approvals process transparent and implemented in a fair manner? c) Does the approvals process result in timely disbursements?	• Approvals decisions are made on the basis of criteria • Approvals criteria match standards set out in Program document • The approvals process is implemented in a clear, consistent and efficient manner • Decision makers are objective and experienced in field relevant to the URP	• Project summaries • Project documents • Evaluation criteria • Approval procedures • Approval documents • Managers and staff • UNDP (Islmbd)

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Implementation	a) Do URP field staff ensure that the experience and skills of local people and organizations are utilized appropriately? b) Do URP field staff take advantage of "teachable moments" in project implementation to facilitate learning? c) Do URP field staff take advantage of unanticipated events or situations during implementation that could further strengthen local organization and lead to additional initiatives? d) Do URP field staff facilitate new relationships between and among communities and municipal authorities that could stimulate new learning and action?	• Projects based on foundation of local knowledge, skills and experience • Projects involve significant participation of people with local knowledge and skills • Local people and organizations are able to participate on their own terms • Project participants take time to reflect on what they have done and incorporate learning in to future practice • Unforeseen circumstances are viewed as opportunities rather than just barriers • Projects rekindle old relationships and build new ones between different social groups within neighbourhoods/ communities • Neighbourhood groups and municipal authorities interact with mutual respect and a shared sense of responsibility for re-building their community • Unexpected requests by neighbourhood groups and municipal authorities for expansion/ replication of projects	• Implementation plans and reports • Project staff • Municipal and community participants • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Project Monitoring and Evaluation	a) How does URP set performance objectives, monitor progress and measure results? b) To what extent does URP use monitoring and evaluation to update its operations?	• Projects designed with measurable results in mind and benchmarks for monitoring progress • URP field staff use a simple yet effective tracking system to monitor the progress of projects and make corrective changes if needed	• Planning documents • Management documents • Eval & Mon reports • URP staff • Observation
D. Financial and Administrative Aspects *Is there a reasoned relationship between the URP's program priorities and financial planning?*	a) On what basis is the overall program budget allocated to the Project Support Office and the three Regional Program offices? b) Do all management staff (Program and Regional Program levels) have the financial information they need to make plans? c) How is the budgeting process tied to project planning at the Regional Program level? d) What is the process and schedule by which funds for operational aspects of project delivery are disbursed to the Regional Program offices? e) What is the process and schedule by which program funds are approved and disbursed to Regional Program offices?	• Budget allocations principles and procedures are uniformally understood by all URP administrators and managers • The Program Manager and Regional Office Managers receive the financial information they need to manage their offices and implement projects • Regional office managers participate in the budgeting process for their offices • Program and operational funds are disbursed to the Regional Offices in a way that facilitates the timely implementation of projects	• Budgets • Financial planning documents • Managers and Admin staff • UNDP • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Does the URP have adequate funds to carry out its mandate? *Are URP expenditures matched to priorities and well balanced between overheads and program delivery?* *Is the URP sufficiently accountable for these expenditures? (overview and Regional Program levels)*	f) Is the Program budget adequate to allow the URP to achieve its immediate objectives? g) How have the URP resources been expended for -overheads? -program management? -program implementation? h) How do expenditures compare with program priorities? i) Do the UNDP and other donors have financial reporting requirements? if so what are they? j) Does the URP have a financial reporting standard to reflect the requirements of these requirements? if so, what is it? k) Is financial reporting done on time, according to agreed upon standards, and does it convey the information necessary for effective program management?	• Program was/is costed in a realistic manner • Ratio of administrative to program expenses is rationalized to the specifications in the Program Document • Comparison of planned to actual expenditures, by program component, rationalized to the specifications in the Program Document • UNDP and other donors satisfied with the URPs financial reporting • URP Project Support office receives financial reports from the Regional Program offices on time and according to a set of reporting standards • URP Program and Regional Program managers able to continuously track the financial position of their respective operations	• Financial statements • Budgets • Cash flow analyses • Analyses of variance • Project disbursement schedule • Managers and Admin staff • Observation • Budgets • Financial reports • Internal controls and procedures documents • Finance/ admin staff (UNDP, UNCHS and program offices) • Program managers • Observation

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Does the URP have sufficient administrative systems in place to support Program operations?	i) Does the UNDP set out guidelines or requirements for program administration? if so what are they? n) Does the Program Support Office and Regional Program offices operate with clear administrative guidelines or procedures (e.g. procedures for reporting on project/program activities, or for recruiting staff)?	• UNDP satisfied with the quality of program documentation submitted • Regional Program reports address common issues, provide a basis for comparison from one regional program to another and can be easily aggregated at the overall Program level • Admin staff in the Program Support and Regional Program Offices build on each others system innovations	• Reports on office and field conditions • URP management • URP staff • Observation
Does the URP function with the appropriate office and field equipment? *(overview and Regional Program level)*	o) Do the Regional Programs have adequate resources to equip the office and carry out project activities?	• Office and field equipment allocated according to program need • All staff in all offices have the basic furniture and equipment they need to carry out their work • Each office has a photocopier, radio and enough computers to allow staff to work efficiently	

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
E. Organizational Culture *Does the URP foster a positive climate for achieving its objectives?* *(overview and Regional Program level)*	a) How does the style of planning, management and decision-making within the Program Support Office and Regional Program Offices help the Program achieve its objectives? b) How compatible are the different styles of program management with the URP as a whole? a) Do URP staff reflect on their work to date in order to improve future practice? b) Does the URP have mechanisms for feeding new information and understanding into its operations? Can this be done quickly? c) Does the URP's organizational learning focus both on process and on results?	• Staff feel valued for their contribution to the Program • Staff enjoy their work • Staff enjoy the company of their collegues • Innovation is encouraged • Staff have a forum for discussing program and office issues • Lines of authority and responsibility are clear • Program managers schedule staff meetings to review activities, draw lessons for future practice and incorporate these lessons into workplans • Program managers (Program Support Office and Regional Support Offices) periodically meet to exchange insights and experiences and incorporate lessons into Program planning process	• Reports on office and working conditions • Monitoring and evaluation reports • Special study documents • Workplans • Management and staff • Observation
F. Flexibility and Resilience *Does the URP have sufficient organizational or contract capability to expand programs and services?* *(overview and Regional Program levels)*	a) Can the URP currently take on increasing or decreasing levels of program activity without compromising ongoing operations?	• Program managers (Program and Regional Program levels) have the information to rapidly assess their financial position, staff capacities and physical resource constraints • Program managers and staff rationalize any program expansion or contraction in terms of the development objective guiding URP	• Program and sub office managers • Staff

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
IV. Results			
A. Outputs *Is the Program achieving its outputs on time and on budget?* *(overview and Regional Program level)*	a) To what extent have the output targets specified in the Program Document been achieved at the mid-point in the URP? b) To what extent has the Program: -engaged neighbourhood groups in an urban rehabilitation process -made repairs and improved services to basic infrastructure? -reduced the immediate health risks of accumulated and other solid wastes -enhanced the capacity of local public and private sector enterprises to supply infrastructure components and building materials -upgraded the skills of a cadre of Afghan professionals to enable them to continue the process of urban recovery	• Number of sub-contracts let versus number expected by the end of the Project • Value of sub-contracts submitted for approval versus value of sub-contracts approved • Increase in the number of neighbourhood groups engaged in urban rehabilitation activities • Number waste disposal systems operating that were not operating before the project • Number of handpumps manufactured • Number of handpumps installed • Extent of clean and covered drains • Demographic and infrastructure surveys and maps	• Beneficiaries • Project staff • Observation • Program Document • Project Summaries • Project Approvals • Signed contracts

TOPICS	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
B. Outcomes *Is the Program having the desired outcomes?* *(overview and Regional Program level)*	a) Is the Program building trust and improved livlihoods among wider and larger circles of actors (e.g. between and amongst families, social groups, neighbourhoods, municipal authorities, private firms) in the Program setting?	• Shared sense of purpose • Municipal authorities delivering quality water and sanitation services on a cost recover basis • Effective project identification, planning and implementation by neighbourhood groups • Increased collaboration among groups • Spontaneous collaborative activities • Increased geographic scope of activities • More beneficiaries from diverse backgrounds (e.g.men, women, all ages, people with disabilities) • Increased employment • Pumps providing clean drinking water • Clean streets	• Beneficiaries • Project staff • Observation • Program Document • Project Summaries • Project Approvals • Signed contracts
C. Impacts *Is the Program contributing to the indigenous process of recovery repair in urban areas of Afghanistan?* *(overview)*	a) To what extent is the Project contributing to the indigenous process of recovery repair in urban areas of Afghanistan?	• A strong network of local organizations which includes government, market and civil at the municipal, district and neighbourhood levels • Afghans... -living in a healthy environment -with increased incomes -drinking clean water -suffering fewer diseases	• Beneficiaries • Project staff • Observation

Appendix IV: Results of Collaborative Evaluation Workshops

HERAT COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION WORKSHOP, April 6, 1996

An exercise carried out with the Herat staff as part of the Mid-Project Evaluation of the Urban Rebilitation Program

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Mandate: • Help the community • Urban Rehabilitation: recreation, urban institutions, welfare, water supply, public health (physical rehabilitation and institutional rehabilitation) • Continuum from basic needs to recreation *To recover social and physical aspects of life in Herat*	• People in communities are asking for recreation improvements • Allocation vs actual disbursement	(A) Peace and security	• Need office admin and financial procedures to help improve efficiency. If no procedures HABITAT Afg should create a country wide system. In immediate term, should innovate locally
Development Objective: • To help people who need it most			• Library resources would help with work • Program needs more input into financial management
Method: 1. Municipal infrastructure 2. Neighbourhood Action Program 3. Solid Waste Disposal Program (cross cutting 1,2) 4. Institutional Strengthening 5. Income generation **Strategies** -strengthening institutions -community development -urban services			• Need quick response fund from UNDP for overhead • Storage facilities for construction materials would improve cost effectiveness • Detailed briefing package/process for senior staff positions would help get activities started more quickly

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Resources: Financial Inputs $100,000 - $200,000 (1995) but only $50,000 spent $500,000 (1996) Physical Inputs No budget for overheads (e.g. office chairs) equippment paid for by project budgets Human Inputs			*STRATEGIC CHOICES* *As this program builds you have to make choices about how best to achieve your objective given: the changing social and economic environment, the resources available, what other actors in the rehabilitation process are doing, and your experience on the job. Here are the notes of the brief discussion we had on this topic:* RATIONALE (internal logic) *Are the methods most appropriate to achieve goals and objectives?* • Should we be rehabilitating recreation facilities?
Results: *expected and unexpected* *I. Outputs - Direct/Immediate* -300 household connections in 8 months -disbursed project funds -organized filing system -computerizing financial transactions and inventory systems -developing procedures for financial administration -completed map of Herat			

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
-detailed maps for D2 and half of 7 -survey 5km water pipe -latrine construction -solid waste clearance (500,000 m3, now 600,000m3) -drafted project docs for funding -monitor work -help office with correspondence -finish hospital rehab -supervised projects in field -liaise with partner agencies -help facilitate people and work -liaise with Islamabad -team building			EFFICIENCY (process of converting inputs to outputs) *are outputs being attained on time, on budget?* •waste truck maintenance vs new truks vs contracting out •hard to apply to social development projects (from a cost effectiveness point of view it depends on the subject of the "effect" •time it takes for projects to come to communities • need to buy supplies when available and prices low and to stockpile them • sharing physical resources with other UN agencies • Project does not have clear picture of administrative structure EFFECTIVENESS (in relation to objectives) *are the outputs consistent with objectives?* • limited disbursement of funds hampering activities, need to look at ratio of allocation to actual disbursement

URBAN REHABILITATION PROJECT, PROGRAM MANAGERS COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION WORKSHOP, Islamabad, April 9th, 1996

An exercise carried out with senior programme staff as part of the Mid-Project Evaluation of the Urban Rebilitation Program

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Mandate: • To improve urban living conditions through repair (physical), recovery (social)	• Strategy for engaging people in the process of urban rehabilitation which is consistent with development objective	(A) Cities constantly in a state of rehabilitation. They are living entities (A) Peace will come back during this program	• Review the means of achieving the objective • Definition of terms (e.g. consultation, sustainability, equity) would be useful
Development Objective: • To promote the indigenous process of rehabilitation in urban centres	• Program is rooted in indigenous process • Program has strong potential for sustainability	(A) Fuel will be available (R) Large scale infrastructure will be destroyed (R) Some indigenous processes might lead the program into activities that don't promote social recovery (A) stick to urban centres only (not secondary towns)	• Integrate emergency response work into URP • Need to have a programming approach which comes back to the development objective • Any project idea which is not sustainable should be put aside

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Beneficiaries: • Priority for poor in an inclusive community process • Local authorities / institutions	• Able to include all members in the development process • Building a "peace bridge" between social groups • Large number of beneficiaries • Increased number of requests for expansion activities		• Need to study the diversity of communities and the relationships between numbers and groups in order to know how to facilitate community participation
Method: • Consultation internally, with community, among implementing partners -meet, share information, make decision • Facilitate stakeholder participation to build dynamism in Program • Involve the people in formulation of activities and implementation • Facilitate civic engagement • Two scales of activity: -Neighbourhood Action Program (70%) -Municipal Infrastructure Program (30%) -Emergency Response (included in 30%)	• Established diagnostic process for discussing urban problems • Spontaneous use of theatre and other media to communicate and analyze issues	(A) UN agencies working in Afghanistan are working in a complementary fashion (R) Currency fluctuations will adversely affect program's ability to engage with local community	• Need clear process for allocating funds to the sub office on the basis of which sub office can provide indicative budget figures • Donors don't want to fund rehabilitation programs - they are much more interested in emergency projects

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Resources and Implementation: Financial - IPF (UNDP) (cost sharing) (approx $8m) - other funds (bilateral) Human - Mazar 7p 6s - Kabul 13p 12s - Herat 6p 8s - Islmbd 1p 12s total 27p 39s Trust-Accountability Diagnostic processes Rehabilitation Steering Committee and technical working groups	• Program is attractive to donors • HABITAT known for what it DOES	(A) Funds will be made available to the Projects in an appropriate time frame (R) Bilateral funding stops	• Need to sell rehabilitation projects using the "emergency" frame of reference • Rationalizing distribution of staff and function by location would also increase efficiency • Team building is essential - people need to see how they fit into the grander picture

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Results: *I. Outputs* • Increased capacity for local governance (neighbourhood and municipal levels) • Developed a rehabilitation methodology (working method) • 1,650 hand pumps made • 350 hand pumps installed • baseline and monitoring systems in place with mapping and survey technology • Encouraged development of small businesses • Strengthened capacity of local people to produce fundable projects (e.g. prefeasibility studies) • *II. Outcomes* • Safe water to 400,000 people • Jobs • Better information base for URP and other agencies/municipalities/communities • Effective program planning and implementation • People monitoring their own progress • Stronger communities • Increased credibility of the UN	• Program is a "magnate" for people returning or arriving for the first time • Community members and municipal authorities adopt working methods in a spontaneous way • Others pick up the working method and adapt it for their own purposes • Working method incorporates analysis of cost effectiveness	(R) Larger infrastructure projects are vulnerable	• Need newsletter to share information with community, within the Program and with other organizations • Harmonize personnel policies with other UNDP agencies Commonly understood and used admin. systems would increase efficiency of operations (systems include: financial reporting, progress reporting, MOAs) • More consultation between offices • Need program management team which would include: int. and Nat.. staff of four offices to prepare program plan and guidelines for assessing costs, quantities and specifications

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
III. Impacts • Healthy people • Increased incomes • Better planning • Greater awareness of interconnectedness of different issues (across different levels) • Spontaneous use of information to present problems to project • Contribution to peace			• Program management should have periodic discussions among all staff in all offices on the subject of current workshop • A lot of potential for expansion • Replication of activities key to releasing potential

Lessons and Recommendations Continued...

- Need human settlement management program to address settlement issues in both urban and rural Afghanistan
- Energy issues have not been considered adequately in design and development of the Program
- Should not be romantic about about "indigenous process" not always equating with social recovery- any activity's rationale has to be based on diagnostic process
- Solutions must be adapted to context
- When peace comes back to Kabul, HABITAT should have ready the groundwork for a resettlement plan to manage the influx (preparing the background: mapping, resource assessment, site preparation)
- Regarding the Program Document target to develop a land policy (Output 4.2) Need rationale not pursue or else address what can realistically be achieved

MAZAR COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION WORKSHOP, April 15, 1996

An exercise carried out with the Mazar staff as part of the Mid-Project Evaluation of the Urban Rebilitation Program

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Mandate: • To improve the life of people in Afghanistan • To improve living condition of urban community • To help Afghan people in Mazar	• Can see happy faces in the community • Greater access to the hospital and other essential services	(A) Cities constantly in a state of rehabilitation. They are living entitites overwhelm successes (A) The security situation allows the program to contiue	• Program should continue to expand • If we stop now will loose alot - need to consolidate lessons to date • As program becomes more specialized - need training
Development Objective: • To activate the community to take part in their physical and social development	• Physical side of project activities support community side and visa versa • Always have a constructive response to a request based on Program's working method	(R) If we concentrate in small areas within the city, external influences will	• Need to stretch beyond Mazar to other communities • Need to continue to nurture until there is peace, local cost recovery and governance
Beneficiaries: • Those ready to engage in the community development process • The most needy, poorest, displaced • Indirectely everyone	• Wakil i Gozars are asking to consult with municipal departments		

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
Method: • Consult communities and municipal organizations • Stimulate private sector through rehabilitation • Ensure each activity has sound rationale • Sequence activities so that they build on each other • Link people and organizations • Consult each other in the office	• Municipal departments and Neighbourhood representatives independently promote the Program's working method	(R) If we insist too much on participation then may slow rehabilitation (A) If private sector working then businesses can supply the Program	*STRATEGIC CHOICES* *As this program builds you have to make choices about how best to achieve your objective given: the changing social and economic environment, the resources available, what other actors in the rehabilitation process are doing, and your experience on the job. Here are the notes of the brief discussion we had on this topic:* 
Resources: Financial/donor Community power Institutional power Trust-Accountability Methods & Systems	• Have support and trust of community • Have support and cooperation of collegues in the office		
Results: *I. Outputs* • Drainage and water supply maps • Communities know which channels to use to address problems • Water pumps, pipes and fittings installed • Karachi system operating • Culverts and drains installed • Community Forums operating - 1,500 women participants • Repaired roads • Smooth office finanical administration/logistics		(R) Larger infrastructure projects are vulnerable	

NOTE: * = Where you think you are today with your Strategic Choice

MIP = Municipal Infrastructure Programme
NAP = Neighbourhood Action Programme

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (R) ASSUMPTIONS (A)	LESSONS & RECOMMEND-ATIONS
II. Outcomes People signing up with Water Department Clean streets Other residents see the improvements and want to participate Water not damaging the streets Literacy levels improving Environment more healthy Incomes increasing Land values increasing Increased commerce Bus/taxi fares decreasing			

Strategic Choices Discussion Continued...

Governance:

Collaborating with Public Sector institutions; creating community based organizations and, thorugh rehabiliation works and community development activities, creating the conditions for private sector development (e.g. improved access, small business development)

Social/Economic:

How do we know you are working with the poorest through local leadership?

The neighbourhood representative is elected/appointed (depending on the gozar) and can, indeed has been changed. The poorest of the poor do participate in local governance.

How can we be sure that we are working with the poorest of the poor through the community forums?

Members of the community forum discuss this question. Forum programs, literacy training, clinic, distribution of blankets and other emergency supplies, seedling distribution, geared to reaching the poorest.

Program Approach:

Regarding Urban vs Regional program focus...

Should go to the larger centres so as not to conflict with other agencies. The current working method could be replicated in secondary towns.

Regarding Single Sector vs Many Sectors...

Whenever there is a request for support which is outside the immediate settlement mandate of HABITAT, staff will contact agency and offer collaboration. Agencies appear to be pleased with this approach.

Physical:

Regarding the inner city vs periphery question...

HABITAT trying to convene a civic planning council. Technical Working Group on Water Supply is a possible foundation for this council. Not for HABITAT to decide how the city should develop, but recognize that rehabilitation activities have an impact. Can stimulate the discussion and offer some criteria. HABITAT operates with its own criteria for itself and tries to avoid projects that do not promote equitable distribution of resources. Want to develop city so that it supports the surrounding rural sector, and keen to support projects that strengthen the core of the city.

KABUL SELF EVALUATION WORKSHOP, April 22, 1996

An exercise carried out with the Kabul staff as part of the Mid-Project Evaluation of the Urban Rebilitation Program

Logic	Indicators of Success	Risks/Assumptions	Lessons/ Recommendations
Mandate: • to improve living conditions • rehabilitation and recovery in urban Afghanistan	• engaging community in urban rehabilitation • people happy with HABITAT	(a) Peace	• Seminars/workshops analysing the URP Programme Document • Seminars/workshops on how to prepare Project Summaries and Documents
Development Objective • to encourage people to rehabilitate/recover	• sustainability • adaptation	(r) Insecurity	• Programme Support Office should be in Kabul • Need an international staff person
Beneficiaries • war affected • poor • local institutions	• ethnic mixing • spread of programme • substantial # of beneficiaries		• Endorse the idea of a Programme wide newsletter • Should exchange staff between Regional Programme Offices
Method • dialogue with the community • dialogue with the municipality • team meetings • technical consultations	• access to funds and fundraisers		• Need more women's representation on staff and programming for women (particularly women) • Need better communication between offices
Resources • Staff (programmers, administrators, caretakers) • Finances • Office equippment	• well established links with municipality,donor community		

Logic	Indicators of Success	Risks/Assumptions	Lessons/ Recommendations
Results • **Outputs:** • **sanitation** • **water supply** • **handpumps** • **access improvements** • **mapping** • **flood protection** • **bridge construction** • **municipality capacity building** • **jobs** • **programme/project plans** • **Impacts:** • **stronger communities**			

URBAN REHABILITATION PROJECT, PROGRAM SUPPORT OFFICE COLLABORATIVE EVALUATION WORKSHOP, Islamabad, April 25, 1996

An exercise carried out with senior programme staff as part of the Mid-Project Evaluation of the Urban Rebilitation Program

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (r) ASSUMPTIONS(a)	LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Mandate of URP: • To improve living conditions of urban areas through repair and recovery of basic infrastructure. Rehabilitation more comprehensive. Repair - physical; Recovery - social and beyond.  **Beneficiaries of the Program:** • War effected; broad approach with priority to the worst affected			• Consider the diagram below in the planning of a post URP phase 
Program Support Office Mandate: • To support RPOs, receive support from RPOs, and to get support from the UNDP and other donors. • To be mastermind of the Program and be overall manager of RPOs. • To filter activities, information and to be the backbone of the program (RPOs rely on the PSO), especially since the PM is located in the PSO. • PSO is the administrative interface between URP/RPO and the UNDP • PSO is like a "processing machine"		(R) Unable to resolve conflict, reconcile conflicting demands (RPO vs UNDP)	• Clarify function of the PSO along the continuum of "support" to "overall policy/ program decision-making"

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (r) ASSUMPTIONS(a)	LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Method: • 3 roles/functions: -Program and Project support -Interface with UN system, and others -Overall planning • In Islamabad because of security and location of other offices, but can be in Kabul.			• Need to improve coordination, information sharing, harmony between PSOs and RPOs. Inter office meetings by section would be helpful • Regular program meetings to resolve conflicting demands on PSO of UNDP and RPOs
Resources: • Human: staff estimate of time put into the following functions: -personnel 12% -program 50% -finance 18% -logistics 17% -procurement 3% • Financial: IPF + cost sharing • Physical: Colour printer for mapping needed, too many cars, need communications, duplication machines and video monitor • Adequacy: Lack of human resources in all fields except mapping. Personnel, finance and procurement.			• Need permanent position for documentation, communication • Title and job descriptions should be changed to match what staff do • Provide a small documentation corner, materials can be photocopied for the field • Field personnel should present with slides their work to PSO staff periodically/regularly as PSO is very interested

LOGIC	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	RISKS (r) ASSUMPTIONS(a)	LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Results: • Respond to field requests with pouches • Carry out Program inventories • Established procedure to process financial information so that RPOs could send PSO better processed information • Devised spreadsheet program to classify expenditures • Keep personnel system operating (e.g. payroll) • Phone calls, faxes, typing, receive pouches, e-mail, create forms and formats • Prepare maps from field data, field training and support for mapping, create maps for presentation and reporting purposes • Hand pump technology - promote local manufacture • Research and development on sanitation technology • Planning and feasibility of Kandahar underway	• Expression of satisfaction from the field • No complaints from RPO, UNDP • Group of people working successfully and happily together • Counterpart in RPO's needs are met • Letter Mazar MSF to say pleased with hand pumps • Hand pump technology has passed tests in the workshop • Community has begun to use maps • Other agencies using maps • Beneficiaries tell us we are successful (re: setting up a program in Kandahar) • Systematized financing system • Reduction of urgent requests from field for funds • In absence of PM PSO continues to be run effectively	(R) Not performing logistics tasks on time - time sensitive work (R) Budget, getting money delayed to pint that bid prices no longer valid (re: hand pumps) (R) Afghan Government, municipality will be upset with HABITAT distributing maps to some agencies (incl. NGOs)	• RPO needs to plan ahead so does not make last minute, urgent requests to PSO • PSO needs lead time from RPOs • Need support in the PSO to get the pouches off to the field in time • RPO staff should understand the constraints that sometimes make it hard to meet deadlines • RPO's should send regular updated mapping information to PSO so that they can have updated maps to give people who request it in Islamabad • Fully document what we do, why, how and where as basic for communications and toward planning and project preparation - a "live archive" • Produce manuals on how to use technologies • Need more information about HABITAT's work elsewhere • Prepare procedures for speeding up obtaining funds from donors

Appendix V: UNCHS (HABITAT) Work in Afghanistan (1990-96)

Appendix VI: Organigrams of the Regional Programme Offices and the Programme Support Office

UNCHS (HABITAT) AFGHANISTAN

PROJECT NO.TITLE: **AFG/93/002 - URBAN REHABILITATION PROGRAMME**
PROJECT OFFICE: **HERAT**



UNCHS Habitat, Urban Rehabilitation Programme
Organogram



P.A= Programme Assistant

UNCHS (HABITAT) AFGHANISTAN

PROJECT: AFG/93/002 - Urban Rehabilitation Programme
Regional Project Office: Kabul



UNCHS (HABITAT) AFGHANISTAN

PROJECT NO./TITLE: AFG/93/002 - URBAN REHABILITATION PROGRAMME
PROJECT OFFICE: ISLAMABAD



MS.ORGCHART

Appendix VII: The Diagnostic and Project Identification Process Using Maps

The Diagnostic a

urvey





OBJECTIVE
To facilitate and support the indigenous
and recovery in the towns of Afghanist
sanitation, building materials, and inter

)d Map

Immediate Objectives

Mun

Neighbourhood Action Programme
-Solid wastes disposal
-Provision of water
-Access improvement

Municipal Strength D



As Example from Herat C

hase-III District Map



METHOD
-To support for physical rehabilitation in accordance with attention to the social and institutional structure.
-To support small-scale initiatives in physical and social condition
-opening dialogue with community representative
-consultation with Wakil-i-Gozer
-diagonstic process of individual (or neighbourhood level) under initial neighbourhood budget.
-resource mapping
-prioritization of problems
-self discovery
-proposed solutions
-technical support
-technical solutions

Date: 22 April 1996

Appendix VIII: Detailed Allocation of Funds to Regional Programmes by Components and Their Activities

Appendix VIII: Detailed Allocation of Funds to Regional Programmes by Components and their Activities

ACTIVITY	KABUL					MAZAR					HERAT							
		Funds					Funds					Funds				Total		
	#Projects	UNDP	Other UN	External	Sub Total	#Projects	UNDP	Other UN	External	Sub Total	#Projects	UNDP	Other UN	External	Sub Total	# Projects	Funds	% of Total
1.Neighbourhood Action Programme																		
water	3		39,256		39,256						1	19,500			19,500	4	58,756	3
handpumps	4	121,443		7,475	128,918	7	119,657	27,830		147,487						11	276,405	14
community infrastruc.	4	19,029	19,570		38,599	1	22,907	1,960		24,867						5	63,466	3
mapping						1	10,011			10,011						1	10,011	1
water/sanitation						1	29,725			29,725						1	29,725	2
community forum						6	59,400			0	1	19,280			19,280	7	19,280	3
survey										0	2	29,908			29,908	2	29,908	1
sanitation										0	1	36,307			36,307	1	36,307	2
community buildings										0								2
Sub-Total	**11**	**140,472**	**58,826**	**7,475**	**206,773**	**16**	**241,700**	**29,790**	**0**	**271,490**	**5**	**104,995**			**104,995**	**32**	**583,258**	**31**
2. Municipal Infrastructure Repair										0								
										0								
water system improv.	6	39,070		13,958	53,028					0	2	74,698	38,314		113,012	8	166,040	8
community infrastruc.	4	27,035	79,394		106,429	2	56,500			56,500	2	27,000			27,000	8	189,929	10
water	1	46,075	17,514		63,589	1	30,000			30,000	1	19,500	4,200		23,700	3	117,289	6
sanitation						1	19,950			19,950	5	143,008	61,267		204,275	6	224,225	12
clean solid waste										0	1	51,500	45,587		97,087	1	97,087	5
Sub-Total	**11**	**112,180**	**96,908**	**13,958**	**223,046**	**4**	**106,450**	**0**	**0**	**106,450**	**11**	**315,706**	**149,368**		**465,074**	**26**	**794,570**	**41**
3. Solid Waste Disposal										0								
										0								
clean solid waste	5		97,496	9,356	106,852	1	19,892			19,892						6	126,744	7
Sub-Total	**5**		**97,496**	**9,356**	**106,852**	**1**	**19,892**			**19,892**						**6**	**126,744**	**7**
4. Municipal Strengthening										0								
										0								
data collection	2			8,000	8,000					0						2	8,000	
mapping	2	22,964			22,964	1	10,011			10,011						3	32,975	2
municipal support	1	19,990			19,990					0						1	19,990	1
Sub-Total	**5**	**42,954**		**8,000**	**50,954**	**1**	**10,011**			**10,011**						**6**	**60,965**	**3**
5. Relief																		
sanitation	1			200,000	200,000											1	200,000	10
shelter	2		100,000	60,000	160,000											2	160,000	8
Sub-Total	**3**		**100,000**	**260,000**	**360,000**											**3**	**360,000**	**18**
Total	35	295,606	353,230	298,789	947,625	22	378,053	29,790		407,843	16	420,701	149,368		570,069	73	1,925,537	100
% of Total	48	15	18	16	49	30	20	2		21	22	22	8		30	100	100	

Source: Programme Support Office

UNCHS (HABITAT) WORK IN AFGHANISTAN (1990 - 1996)

UNCHS (Habitat) - AFG/90/008 Housing for Resettlement

The philosophy of the project was not to build houses but rather to facilitate and support the indigenous process of repair and recovery.

Activities included:
1. supply and transport of roofing timber.
2. establishment of small-scale rural enterprises to:
   * manufacture reinforced concrete beams
   * manufacture of windows and doors
   * manufacture stabilised soil blocks
   * manufacture of concrete pipes for culverts
3. repairs to public village schools.
4. improvements to community water supplies through:
   * protection of springs
   * installation of handpumps
   * cleaning of underground and surface irrigation systems
   * construction of village water reservoirs
5. access improvements, including:
   * repairs to essential pedestrian or vehicular bridges
   * upgrading secondary roads
6. urban upgrading works, including:
   * pedestrian access stairways
   * improved drainage
   * waste clearance
7. urban and rural flood protection works.
8. distribution of emergency shelter materials.
9. establishment of a materials testing laboratory.
10. formulation of National Shelter Strategy for Afghanistan.

1989 - 1994

On the whole returnees from neighbouring countries and internally displaced Afghans have resettled in the countries major cities. In response, HABITAT has adapted its resettlement approaches for use in an Urban Context. In 1995, HABITAT began a two year Urban Rehabilitation Programme.

1995 -

* The Housing for Resettlement Programme spent approxmately five million dollars of UNDP funds and has delivered approximately another two million dollars worth of resources on behalf of WFP, UNHCR, UNDRO, UNOCHA, UNICEF, RDF, NORDIC FUND, NRC/NCA, Norwagian, BRITISH, CANADIAN and AUSTRALIAN Governments and the EUROPIAN UNION.



Legend
- provincial boundaries
- districts boundaries
- project areas
- sub-office run areas
- municipality districts (D..)
- capital
- provincial capitals

Preparation date : April 1996

It grew from an earlier project (Research for low-cost indigenous building materials - AFG/86/033)

UNCHS (Habitat) - AFG/93/002 Urban Rehabilitation Programme

The objective of the programme is to facilitate and support the indigenous process of repair and recovery in the urban areas

STRATEGY (implemented and/or ongoing) are:
1. Work with and reinforce the Municipality.
2. Focus on areas of significant displacement and urgent need.
3. Establish parallel community and municipal programme lines.
4. Decentralize implementation.
5. Develop a system of field-based micro-project design.
6. Stress national implementation where feasible.



HERAT

- water supply improvements (for 80,000 families)
- sanitation (for 50,000 families)
- mapping/survey (for 100 families)



MAZAR I SHARIF

- water supply improvements (for 50,500 families)
- handpump production (for 3,200 families)
- sanitation (for 100,000 families)
- access improvements (for 3,100 families)
- mapping/survey (for 100 families)
- community forum (for 800 families)



The programme has been launched for the urban centres, currently in Kabul estimated (2.8 million), Mazar i Sharif nearly (0.8 million), Herat roughly (0.5 million) and with a prospective office in Kandahar around (0.5 million).
The beneficiaries of the projects impleminted are:
Kabul city 700,000 families
Mazar city 150,000 families
Herat city 300,000 families



KABUL

- water supply improvements (for 400,000 families)
- handpump production (for 7,100 families)
- sanitation (for 500,000 families)
- access improvements (for 5,000 families)
- flood protection (for 100 families)
- mapping/survey (for 1,000 families)
- municipal support (for 200,000 families)
- relief (for 15,000 families)